INSTRUCTIONS FOR SECOND PAPER
Students must choose two country cases from the available sources in the course (e.g., Linz and Stepan 1996, Shugart and Carey 1992, plus other works placed on closed reserve). Students must compare the constitutional design, party system structure, and other electoral dynamics that bear upon the effectiveness of democratic procedures.
Specifically, the paper should analyze how specific institutions in each case have affected (a) representation, (b) elite contestation, and (c) interest aggregation and coherence. Analysis of linked concepts such as efficiency/identifiability and flexibility would add value to the paper. Students should first define an analytical criteria for Aeffectiveness@ based on these three dimensions, and then apply this criteria systematically in the paired case comparison.
Questions to ask when formulating an analytical criteria:
What are the trade-offs between representation and governability in each case?
Do formal institutions minimize the costs of these trade-offs?
Do formal institutions enhance the efficiency of policy-making or raise the costs of decision-making and implementation?
How do formal institutions strengthen contingent consent and bounded uncertainty?
How do formal institutions increase the accountability of representatives to the electorate?
These questions are only indicative. I do not expect the analysis in the essay will cover every one of these questions exhaustively. As always, I am Alooking for@ the best organized, clear, and thoughtful analysis on key points that you are able to muster for this assignment.
The paper must be a minimum of six pages in length but cannot go beyond eight pages (typed, double-spaced, 12cpi, one-inch margins, and paginated). Due: Monday, November 8 at 5 p.m. at my office. This paper will be graded rigorously.
I will organize a discussion section to answer questions and brainstorm ideas for this writing assignment well before the due date.
Research Materials:
The following materials have been placed on closed reserve for the simulation and the second paper:
Jon Elster et al., eds., Institutional Design in Post-Communist
Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (
Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries (Yale, 1999).
Gary Cox, Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems (Cambridge, 1997).
Valerie Bunce, Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State (Cambridge, 1999).
Carlos Lijphart and Carlos Waisman, eds. Institutional Design in New Democracy: Eastern Europe and Latin America (Westview, 1996).
Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg
Shugart, eds. Presidentialism and
Democracy in
Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in
Scott Morgenstern, Patterns of Legislative Politics (Cambridge, 2003).
Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif, eds. Legislative
Politics in
Sunil Bastian and Robin Luckman,
eds. Can Democracy Be Designed? (Zed
Books, 2003).
You should also consult the following websites:
Elections and Electoral Systems Database
Official Webpages of All Governments on the Planet
Inter-Parliamentary Union Links to All Parliaments
Georgetown Latin American Political Institutions Database
International Foundations for Election Systems
University of Essex Database on East European Electoral Systems
In addition to these materials you should search Electronic Databases off Muse.
HINT: Begin your research early. You have more than two weeks. Rely on your colleagues for sources. If you organize teams, you can reduce your research costs.