Observers and political activists have long fought over how to best reconcile the existence of capitalism, with its necessary inequalities, and the principles of a democratic republic, which postulates equality with respect to rights. In this course, we consider what political science can teach us about the relationship between money and politics, and how best to assess the normative consequences of this interaction.

This is a seminar course, which places more responsibility than most courses on the preparation and participation of students. Participation in class will count for 30% of the final grade. As part of the participation grade, students must submit to me, via email prior to class, two specific questions about the readings that may serve as the basis for our discussions that day. These questions can be of a substantive or critical nature. Out of the 22 class sessions during which we will discuss readings, each student must submit question sheets for 17 to receive full credit.

Half of the grade for this course will be based on a substantial research paper of approximately 25 pages in length. If you wish, you may work in teams of up to three on this paper. A research proposal, due May 3, will be worth 10% of the final grade, while the final paper will be worth 40%. I will talk in detail about my expectations for this paper in a later class period.

Finally, Twenty-five percent of the grade will be based on a presentation to the rest of the class based on the topic of your paper. You will be expected to summarize your research question, illustrate why it is important in the context of existing research on money in politics, and discuss the evidence you are gathering to answer your question.

The following books are available for purchase at the bookstore. Other readings (Marked RR on syllabus) are available on reserve at Gould Library:

• Corrado, Anthony, Thomas Mann, Daniel Ortiz and Frank Sorauf. Campaign Finance Reform: A Sourcebook. Washington, DC: Brookings, 1997.
• Ferguson, Thomas. Golden Rule: The Investment Theory of Party Competition and the Logic of Money-Driven Political Systems. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
• Smith, Bradley A., Unfree Speech: The Folly of Campaign Finance Reform. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.
• Donnelly, David, Janice Fine, and Ellen Miller. Money and Politics: Financing Our Elections Democratically. Boston: Beacon Press, 1999.

April 1

II – Business, Labor, and American Political Development

April 3

• Ferguson, Thomas, Golden Rule: The Investment Theory of Party Competition and the Logic of Money-Driven Political Systems. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. pp. 3-50.

 

April 5

• Ferguson, pp. 50-86.
• Orren, Karen. "The Primacy of Labor in American Constitutional Development." American Political Science Review, 89:2 (June 1995), pp. 377-388. (RR)

April 8

• Ferguson, pp. 347-357.
• Smith, Mark A. "Public Opinion, Elections, and Representation Within A Market Economy: Does the Structural Power of Business Undermine Popular Sovereignty?" American Journal of Political Science, 43:3 (July 1999), pp. 842-863. (RR)

April 10

• North, Douglass, "Structure and Performance: The Task of Economic History," Journal of Economic Literature, 16:3 (September 1978) pp. 963-978. (RR)

III – The Current System: What is it and How Does it Work?

Overview

April 12

• Corrado, Anthony, Thomas Mann, Daniel Ortiz and Frank Sorauf. Campaign Finance Reform: A Sourcebook. Washington, DC: Brookings, 1997, pp. 5-35.
• Summary and analysis of Shays-Meehan-McCain-Feingold as enacted. (Handout)

 

Presidential System

April 15

• Corrado, Anthony. "The Presidential Public Financing System." Chapter 5 in Corrado, Anthony. Campaign Finance Reform: Beyond the Basics. New York: Century Foundation Press, 2000, pp. 53-66. (RR)
• Haynes, Audrey A., Paul-Henri Gurian, Stephen M. Nichols. "The Role of Candidate Spending in Presidential Nomination Campaigns." Journal of Politics, 59:1 (Feb., 1997), pp. 213-225. (RR)

Soft Money

April 17

• Sourcebook, pp. 167-177.
• La Raja, Ray, "Sources and Uses of Soft Money: What Do We Know?" in Gerald C. Lubenow, Ed., A User’s Guide to Campaign Finance Reform, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), pp. 83-108. (RR)

April 19

• David Magleby, Ed. Outside Money: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 1998 Congressional Elections, (Lanham, MD; Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), Chapters 1 & 2 (pp. 1-40). (RR)
• Brennan Center for Justice, New York University School of Law. "The Purposes and Beneficiaries of Soft Money." (Handout)

 

Issue Advocacy

April 22

• Sourcebook, pp. 227-242, 271-274.
• Annenberg Public Policy Center, University of Pennsylvania. "Issue Advertising in the 1999-2000 Election Cycle." (Handout)

 

PACs and Lobbying

April 24

• Sourcebook, pp. 123-129; 143-149.
• Hart, David. "High Tech Learns to Play the Washington Game, or The Political Education of Bill Gates and Other Nerds," in Allan J. Cigler and Burdett Loomis, Eds. Interest Group Politics, 6^th Edition. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2002, pp. 293-312. (RR)

April 26

NO CLASS

IV. Effects of Money on Politics?

April 29

• Baumgartner, Frank and Beth Leech, Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and Political Science, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), Chapter 7, pp. 120-146. (RR)

 

May 1

• Mitchell, William C. and Michael Munger, "Economic Models of Interest Groups: An Introductory Survey," American Journal of Political Science, 35:2, pp 512-546. (RR)

 

May 3

• Clawson, Dan, Alan Neustadtl, and Mark Weller, Dollars and Votes; How Business Campaign Contributions Subvert Democracy, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998), Chapter 2, pp. 29-62. (RR)
• RESEARCH PROPOSAL DUE

May 6

MIDTERM BREAK

May 8

• McChesney, Fred, Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997). Introduction, Chapters 1 and 2, pp. 1-42. (RR)

May 10

• Bauer, Raymond A., Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter. American Business and Public Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade. New York: Atherton Press, 1967, Chapters 24 and 28, pp. 350-357; 396-399. (RR)
• Hall, Richard, and Frank Wayman, "Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees." American Political Science Review, 84:3, (Sep. 1990), p. 797-820. (RR)

May 13

• Johnson, Bertram and Robert Van Houweling. "The Best Money Congress Can Buy: Legislative Fundraising and the Donor Collective Action Problem." Draft, 2002. (Handout)

May 15

• Godwin, R. Kenneth, and Barry J. Seldon. "What Corporations Really Want from Government: The Public Provision of Private Goods." in Allan J. Cigler and Burdett Loomis, Eds. Interest Group Politics, 6^th Edition. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2002, pp. 205-224. (RR)

V. – Reform Proposals and Controversies

May 17

• Smith, Bradley A. Unfree Speech: The Folly of Campaign Finance Reform. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001, pp. 3-13; 17-38 (skim); 39-64.

May 20

• Donnelly, David, Janice Fine, and Ellen Miller. Money and Politics: Financing Our Elections Democratically. Boston: Beacon Press, 1999, pp. 3-30; 49-59; 69-73.

May 22

• Smith, pp. 65-105.

May 24

• Smith, pp. 109-166.
• Donnelly et al. pp. 60-64.

May 27

• Smith, pp. 170-227.
• Donnelly et al. pp. 74-77.

May 29

Student Presentations

May 31

Student Presentations

June 3

Student Presentations

June 5

Conclusion