Breaking In or Breaking Out:
Institutions and the Political Career Trajectories of
Women in Chile

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Introduction

Chile’s return to democracy in 1990 marked the fall of one of Latin America’s longest standing dictatorships [1973-1990] and the fragmentation of the widely visible pro-democracy women’s movement.¹ Leaders of Chile’s women’s movement were hopeful that the return to democracy and reinstitution of political parties would provide new opportunities for increasing women’s representation and access to decision-making posts. Unfortunately, Chile’s political institutions hurt rather than helped advance women in formal politics. The Inter-Parliamentary Union states that women comprise only 4.17% of the Senate and only 12.5% of the Chamber of Deputies, one of the lowest percentages of women in positions of political decision-making in Latin America (IPU online, 2005). In spite of such poor representation, the two front-runners for the presidential election in winter of 2005 are both females, and neither is riding on the “posthumous coattails of powerful husbands,” (Christian Science Monitor, 2004) the only path to the presidency for women in Latin America’s past. How did these women rise to the highest political echelons of power despite the fact that there are no more women in congress today than there were three decades ago?

Kathya Araujo argues that Chilean political parties are currently in a crisis of legitimacy because they have not adapted to the new characteristics of society over the last fifteen years of redemocratization (Araujo, 2001: 5). She claims that while the Chilean culture is much more disposed to vote for women, institutional barriers continue to plague women’s representation in the formal sphere (Araujo, 2001). A comparison of the United Nations Development Programme’s gender-related development index (GDI) verses gender empowerment measure (GEM) for Chile strengthens her argument. The GDI is a composite index measuring average achievement in the three basic dimensions captured in the human development index—a long
and healthy life, knowledge, and a decent standard of living—adjusted to account for inequalities between men and women (UNDP index, 2003). The GEM is a composite index measuring gender inequality in three basic dimensions of empowerment—economic participation and decision-making, political participation and decision-making, and power over economic resources (UNDP index, 2003). While Chile ranks high (42\textsuperscript{nd}) in comparison to other Latin American countries on the GDI, it falls to 53\textsuperscript{rd} in terms of its GEM—among the last places in the Latin American and Caribbean region for this measurement (UNDP index, 2003).

**Figure 1: GEM Ranking in Latin American Countries\textsuperscript{2}**

The results of these indices suggest that while Chilean women are roughly equal to men in terms of levels of education and development factors, their access to positions of decision-making power are severely diminished.

By tracing women’s political career trajectories, important differences arise from the pathways of male politicians, which reveal both the greatest barriers to women’s empowerment in formal politics as well as the successful alternative route of the two female pre-presidential
candidates. Most female politicians who try to follow a traditional political career trajectory defined by success in a legislative political career position from the municipal to the national level are discouraged because of the sheer difficulty in becoming selected as a viable candidate. Such women cite that the political institutions, or parties, are the greatest stumbling block to their success in formal politics. In addition, Chilean political parties operate under a highly unique electoral system, which further disadvantages women and is the subject of much scholarly debate. A brief synopsis of Chile’s electoral system provides the necessary background to understand the complexity of the institutional debate, which will be discussed further below.

The History of Chilean Political Institutions

For most of its democratic history, Chile employed a multimember district open-list proportional representation (PR) electoral system for the Chamber of Deputies and Senate elections. However, following the seventeen-year authoritarian rule of General Augusto Pinochet, military authorities imposed a series of constitutional and electoral changes aimed at party system transformation. In an attempt to change the long-standing nature of polarized party competition between the Center, Left, and Right blocks (Gray, 2003: 340-1), military authorities adopted a binominal majoritarian (BM) system marked by the formation of two multiparty coalitions of the Center-Left Concertación and the Right coalition of the Unión por Chile.3 The BM system is an electoral formula designed for two member districts, allowing each electoral alliance to present two candidates for election to the Chamber of Deputies in each of the country’s sixty electoral districts. The binominal system is also employed for the Senate elections within nineteen circunscripciones (senatorial districts). In both instances, voters opt for a single candidate from a series of two candidate open lists.
Since the electoral system is defined by the operational characteristics of D'Hondt proportional representation (PR) system in two-member districts (Siavelis, 1997: 657), in order for a coalition to win both seats it must double the vote of the nearest competing list. The BM system also establishes high thresholds, so that to obtain one seat in a district a coalition must have at least 33.4 percent of the votes, but to win both seats it must win 66.7 percent (Gray, 2003: 64). The military authorities who created the BM system knew from public opinion polls that the Right would likely acquire only 35-40 percent of the vote, thus the electoral formula would enable them to win at least one of the two seats in each district (or 50 percent of the seats) with a little over 33 percent of the vote (Siavelis, 2002). Given the high threshold of 66.7 percent of the vote necessary to win two seats, sharing a list with a relatively stronger candidate in a district where the coalition can be expected to win under 66.7 percent of the vote is a recipe for defeat (Siavelis, 2002: 421). Thus, party leaders have incentives to seek pairings with weaker coalition partners to allow them to reach the 33 percent threshold but still be able to beat their list partner, or to seek pairings with extremely strong partners to allow the electoral list to doblar, or win both seats in the district by crossing the 66.7 percent threshold.

*Why Women Enter or Do not Enter Formal Politics*

The transformation from an open-list proportional representation (PR) system to a BM system after Pinochet’s dictatorship became the subject of much institutional debate within scholarly circles. Many argue that the change in the electoral system is the main culprit for the crisis of representation of minority groups, such as women in the formal sphere (Siavelis, 1997: 652). These scholars argue that the BM system changed the competitive dynamic of the prior multiparty system (Guzmán, 1993) into a two-party system of competition. They argue that the
creation of new electoral lists under the BM system encourages competition leading to a two-party system that disadvantages minority groups such as women (Baldez & Carey, 1996:12).  

In contrast, other institutional scholars such as Peter Siavelis argue that it is not the change in the electoral system that has created the crisis of minority group representation in formal politics, but rather party competition (Siavelis, 1993; Siavelis, 1997). In his analysis of candidate list formation, Siavelis studies the competition and negotiation that goes on between individual party, subpact, and intracoalitional candidate selection procedures. He argues that the sum interaction of these different sets of groups, subgroups, and individual leaders determines who runs where and under what circumstances (Siavelis, 2002: 420). Although he does not discuss how candidate selection procedures specifically disadvantage women, his analysis of variables that enhance the attractiveness of potential parliamentary candidates, namely incumbency, nationally known party leaders, and having the right apellido (surname), are all factors that specifically disadvantage women candidates (Siavelis, 2002: 426). In addition, his analysis of strategic party placement of candidates on the ballot and the designation of candidates to certain districts elucidates the candidate selection procedures that specifically disadvantage women.

Along with Siavelis, Pippa Norris and Joni Lovenduski argue that party constraints, namely candidate selection procedures rather than the electoral system, is the fundamental unit of analysis to understanding the lack of minority group representation in formal politics. Norris and Lovenduski also emphasize social constraints as another important factor in the underrepresentation of minority groups. Their “supply and demand model of recruitment” highlights the importance of both explanatory variables.
According to Norris and Lovenduski’s model, candidate selection procedures are considered demand-side constraints, while social background and burdens are considered supply-side factors. They argue that party leaders can be labeled as “demand-side selectors,” because they choose candidates depending upon their perceptions of the applicants’ abilities, qualifications, and experiences. During the selection process, prejudice occurs when party members are unwilling to choose a qualified candidate because they expect he or she would lose votes among the electorate (Norris and Lovenduski, 1993: 378). In addition, “supply-side” factors place an emphasis on the applicants rather than the party leadership, arguing that party members would like to have more well-qualified women candidates, but few come forward. They highlight
constraints such as resources (time, money and experience) and motivational factors (drive, ambition and interest) as explanations for the small pool of minority applicants, or shortage of supply. Thus, women can be disadvantaged from either the supply or demand side depending on whether candidate selection procedures or social burdens present a greater barrier to their representation.

The supply and demand model of recruitment explains the important constraints that affect minority group representation, but it omits one factor that is especially important for women. In their analysis of supply-side constraints, Norris and Lovenduski exclude the additional burden women face in terms of raising a family and upholding traditional social norms. I label this added social burden as a “lifecycle constraint” that is specific to women as opposed to other minority groups. Jill Hills also highlights the importance of this variable, which she names “life-style” constraints, to explain why there are so few women local councilors in Britain (Hills, 1983: 39-52). Lifecycle constraints not only affect a woman’s decision to choose a political career path, but add much greater weight to Norris and Lovenduski’s measurement of time, one of their specific resource constraints that disproportionately affects women as opposed to other minority groups from choosing a political career.

I argue that a “combination approach” of institutional factors such as party candidate selection procedures, and social constraints such as lifecycle factors, best explains the lack of representation of women in the formal sphere. Using Norris and Lovenduski’s supply and demand model of recruitment as an empirical framework, both of these explanatory variables are strengthened through in-depth personal interviews of female politicians in Chile. In addition, these two variables vary in importance depending on the specific party in Chile. While demand-constraints such as intraparty competition and party leadership impedes candidate selection of
women in some parties, supply-side factors such as social burdens best explains the underrepresentation of women in other parties.

My definition of the “traditional political career trajectory” is derived from Drude Dahlerup’s definition, based on the idea of “winners and losers” and competition and confrontation, rather than on mutual respect, collaboration and consensus building. In addition, Dahlerup considers the traditional career pathway an unspoken masculine model that is full of implicit rules and norms of which most women are unaware (Dahlerup, 1998). My definition of an “alternative political career trajectory” is based on a compilation of testimonies recorded during personal interviews with women politicians in Chile.

I compiled my data from approximately 18 personal interviews varying in length from 10 minutes to 3 hours and conducted in the metropolitan areas of Santiago and Valparaíso, Chile over the course of the month of December 2004. Although the majority of interviewees were with women who held legislative careers as either senators or deputies, I also interviewed sociologists (including men), parliamentary secretaries, ministerial directors, and non-governmental organization (NGO) directors. All of the interviewees were asked the fundamental question of why there are so few women politicians in Chile, however, depending on their specific career or expertise, my follow-up questions varied considerably (Appendix A).

Chile serves as an excellent case study for studying both the institutional and social constraints to women’s underrepresentation. It offers a rare test of the electoral/party system relationship, since the binominal system did not emerge as a result of negotiations and choice by political parties but rather was imposed by an outgoing military regime (Siavelis, 1997: 653). Secondly, as Manuel Antonio Garretón has stated, political parties are the *columna vertebral*, or the backbone of the country’s political process, and have remained strong and ideologically
distinct despite the process of democratization, unlike the weakening of political parties in many other Latin American countries (Garretón, 1987: 89). Moreover, the unique political trajectories of both female pre-presidential candidates for the election in winter of 2005, attests to the explanatory barriers discussed above, while providing an opportunity for women to “break through” institutional and social constraints if they are willing to choose an alternative political career trajectory. Before unpacking the supply and demand model of recruitment through empirical evidence in Chile, a more detailed clarification of “party competition” within Chile’s coalition system is necessary to understand the demand-side constraints of candidate selection procedures specifically.

*Party Competition within Political Coalitions: A Breakdown of Chilean Candidate Selection Procedures*

The multiparty coalitions that have dominated Chile’s unique electoral system are the Center-Left *Concertación* and the Right coalition of the *Unión por Chile*. The *Concertación* currently consists of the following major parties: *Partido Democrata Cristiano*, or the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), the *Partido Radical Social Demócrata*, or Radical Social Democratic Party (PRSD), the *Partido Pro Democracia*, or Party for Democracy (PPD), and the *Partido Socialista*, Socialist Party (PS). The *Unión por Chile* currently consists of two major parties, the *Renovación Nacional* or the National Renewal Party (RN) and the *Unión Democrática Independiente*, Independent Democratic Union (UDI). As Peter Siavelis argues, the creation of the bipolar coalition system is at odds with the continued existence of a deeply entrenched multiparty system in Chile (Siavelis, 2002: 423). Siavelis claims that despite the coalition system, parties continue to compete with each other in subpact and intercoalitional bargaining to ensure that each major party receives an equal distribution of seats within the districts.8 Figure 3
provides a breakdown of how candidates are selected within the Center-Left coalition of the
*Concertación*, although similar negotiations occur within the coalition on the Right of the *Unión por Chile*.

**Figure 3: Coalitions, Subpacts, and Party Stages for Candidate Selection Procedures**

Using the PPD as an example, Figure 3 demonstrates how candidates are chosen from the intraparty negotiation level to the intracoalitional bargaining level for the Center-Left *Concertación* in a specific district. First, the PPD party elites select two candidates; second, the PPD’s candidates are negotiated within a subpact between the PPD and the PS party and 2 out of the 4 party candidates move onto the intercoalitional bargaining stage; third, intercoalitional bargaining occurs in the final stages of the selection process between the two subpacts of the PS/PPD and the PDC and minor parties aligned with it, such as the RNC, to choose two candidates from the coalition as a whole for a specific district. Figure 3 illustrates the three
stages of negotiation that occur and will be referred to in the following sections to demonstrate at which stages women are specifically disadvantaged.

“Women Can’t Win:” Understanding Demand-Side Constraints to Candidate Selection Procedures

Using Norris and Lovenduski’s framework and Peter Siavelis’s candidate selection model, the party selection procedures are the demand constraints in the supply and demand model of recruitment (see Figure 2) that occur at the party, subpact and coalition level (see Figure 3). One deputy highlights the difficulty she faces under Chile’s candidate selection procedures, stating:

It is difficult [to become a candidate] because we have a very complicated electoral system. In the Concertación we have four [major] parties, but we can only elect 2 candidates [for each district]. Because of this system, first we have to decide which parties will get to have a candidate, and then from there we have to decide which candidate to choose. Therefore, it is very difficult to become a candidate (Saa, 2004).

At the individual party level (see Figure 3), a party attempts to put forth the candidate with the best “packaging,” someone who can appeal to party bases and the regional and national councils. Women are at a disadvantage since they are not already in decision-making posts on the regional and national councils and are therefore less likely to be chosen as attractive candidates. Although candidate selection can occur in one of two extremes of control, either by the party leader or by registered party members or support, most power in candidate selection procedures lies between these extremes. In Chile, the national party councils are so powerful that most candidatures are in effect determined by party elites. This poses a threat for women candidates who may be popular with a social base, but who are not recognized or represented by party elites, and are thus disadvantaged in candidate selection procedures.
In addition, as scholars such as Timothy Scully and Scott Mainwaring, argue attractiveness of potential parliamentary candidates is often heavily dependent on incumbency as an indicator of renomination, which indicates extreme lack of party discipline and a severe disadvantage for women who are new to the field. Having the right *apellido* or family name, also enhances the attractiveness of candidates (Siavelis, 2002: 426). Thus, it is not surprising that of the combined number of female deputies and senators, of which there are only 17, three have the last name Frei, Allende or Ibañez, all traditionally important names in Chilean politics. One female deputy highlights this phenomenon stating, “Men within leadership positions in the parties think that these women (such as Isabel Allende, Carmen Frei, etc) have a greater chance of winning elections in districts, and are more likely to allow them to run for office than those of us outside of the political party ties” (Saa, 2004). Moreover, all but two of the rest of the female politicians have long-term affiliations with their respective party, and/or important familial relationships with Chile’s historical past. Deputy María Antonieta Saa highlights her trajectory as an anomaly, stating:

Men within the parties will often let women who have familial connections and political ties to slide past some of the qualifications and regulations that are more harshly enforced by those of us who do not have such connections. Men in leadership positions in the party tend to think that these women who are the daughters or sisters of male politicians will have more of a chance to win in electoral districts than those of us outside of the party ties. For example, Deputy Carolina Tohá is very closely tied to our political party (the PPD), and it is much easier if you assume that trajectory (Saa, 2004).

Chile’s coalition system also creates the formation of subpacts, such as the one within the *Concertación* between the Socialist party (PS) and the Party for Democracy (PPD) (see Figure 3), which can disadvantage women as well. On the subpact level, intraparty competition occurs in an attempt for each party to increase its respective influence and win more election slates. Such intraparty competition may induce what Pippa Norris discusses as “indirect prejudice”
against women, where party members may be unwilling to choose a minority candidate, such as a woman, because they expect they would lose votes among the electorate (‘But she’d never get in’), even if she is the most qualified candidate (Norris and Lovenduski, 1993: 378).

Women on both the Right and the Left highlighted the machista, or sexist, tendencies that suggest social bias in the political parties and their “indirect prejudice” towards minority groups, such as women. Senator Matthei of the rightist UDI party is 1 of 2 women in the Senate and occupies a top leadership position in its economic commission, but she states that it is still three times more difficult for her to prove her capability as a woman than if a male politician were to occupy her position (Matthei, 2004). Likewise, Deputy Ximena Vidal of the PPD discusses the “direct prejudice” she feels within her party, as her male cohorts judge her because she is a woman, rather than as an individual. She states:

We don’t have the same opportunities to participate in the spaces that men occupy within our party, the men shut off those spaces [from women]. They don’t open the same resources and space for women as they do for themselves. This doesn’t just happen in our party, but in all the parties. There is a theme in Chilean politics that if you talk about proyectos de ley [bills], it is strictly within the men. They only talk to us [women] when they need our support to pass the law, etc. If they don’t need our help, they ignore us (Vidal, 2004).

Under the coalition system, this social bias is magnified, as parties are forced to undergo negotiation with other parties in order to select candidates, and the increased competition only hurts women’s chances further.

Once candidate selection procedures face the intracoalitional stage (see Figure 3), parties and subpacts face the added constraint of the high electoral thresholds dictated by the BM system, which makes it very difficult for the coalition to achieve a two seat victory. Often times, individual parties engage in strategic negotiation with other parties to place their candidates on the same list with either an extremely strong candidate to achieve the 66 percent necessary for a
two-seat victory, or a weak candidate, who will help pass the 33 percent threshold but not outpoll their candidate. Thus, a “weak-strong” strategy can occur in the electoral system in which a candidate capable of passing the first electoral threshold is matched with a weaker candidate whose votes will simply ensure that the first candidate passes the threshold, but who has little possibility of winning a seat.

For women, who are inherently weaker candidates due to their recent entrance into the political field and lack of representation in party leadership, they risk running against extremely strong candidates in the 2-member districts, or running in difficult districts, where the specific coalition has less identified popular support. Since ballot and district placement are up to the hands of the party elites and women are not adequately represented in these leadership posts (Appendix B), their chances of being chosen as the most qualified candidate compared to their male counterparts is significantly reduced. One female deputy of the leftist PPD underscores her own frustration with the system:

The binominal system that was created during the epoch of the dictatorship was created so that the minority parties would have the same representation as the major parties, to resemble a very democratic system. However, from my point of view it has been politically ‘spun’ to be considered democratic when it actually does otherwise. For example, within the Concertación, the PPD and the PDC are constantly fighting for the votes. It is much more difficult for women to actually become candidates (as opposed to men), because there is constantly an extremely large amount of people running for an office. For example, in my district in the North, there are 4 other women running for the same position. Thus, it creates an internal competition within the party, and you need to have time, money, and political relations within the party to be able to win (Muñoz, 2004).

In contrast, Deputy María Angélica Cristi of the Right-wing UDI party adamantly refutes the notion that party candidate selection procedures disadvantage female candidates. She states:

“The truth is that women aspirants that have wanted to become a candidate within one of the major parties on the Right (RN and UDI) have gotten it, and that in Chile the Right-wing parties have had proportionally more women in popularly elected positions than women in the Concertación (Cristi, 2004).”
Thus, party candidate selection procedures, or demand-side constraints, may vary in importance across party lines.

“Why don’t more Women come Forward?” Understanding Supply-Side Factors and Social Constraints to Women’s Underrepresentation

Along with demand-side constraints, many party members indicate that they would like to choose qualified women candidates, but few come forward. Female politicians from the UDI party in particular, a young Right-wing party that has grown in popularity in recent years, argue that because the qualifications for their candidates are extremely high, there are very few male or female candidates that meet their expectations. Senator Matthei of the UDI states that the problem does not lie within strict party candidate selection procedures, but rather the simple problem that there are just not enough qualified women willing to come forward as a political candidate. This shortage in supply is due to the fact that the traditional political career trajectory is one that is often “risky, grueling and unglamorous” (Norris and Lovenduski, 1993: 380).

Thus, female politicians who do assume the traditional trajectory are quite similar despite party lines, and tend to represent the upper socioeconomic echelons of Chilean society, marked as predominantly middle-aged or older with strong educational backgrounds. Despite their strong qualifications, this small pool of women still finds the traditional political career exceedingly difficult due to personal lifecycle constraints that create dual demands of employment and family, which create an additional disadvantage for women as compared to other minority groups that are trying to enter formal politics.

Lifecycle constraints place women at a particularly disadvantage in terms of the supply-side factors of political resources (time, money and experience) as well as motivational factors
(drive, ambition, and interest) necessary to achieve a successful traditional political career trajectory. Of the resource factors, time seems to be the greatest disadvantage for women. As the primary caregivers of the family, and with little sign of any change in this traditional social responsibility in the near future, a Chilean woman who assumes a political career trajectory pays a significant personal cost. In order to be active in a party, deputies and senators must be present at all meetings, involving double or even triple days for women who have families to care for as well. Deputy Adriana Muñoz of the PPD underscores time as a significant barrier in her life as well as why it presents a greater difficulty for female as opposed to male deputies:

All of the political organizations in the world are organized under this masculine system, which includes the demanding work schedules, congressional meetings until 1 AM, etc. This schedule assumes that men can come home at this hour and that the wife and kids will be waiting for him. A woman who assumes this schedule finds it much more difficult. If she comes home late her husband will assume she is out with another man, rather than the typical stereotype of men going out after work to go to the bars. I also have it difficult because I work in a district in the North, live in Santiago, and have sessions of congress in Valparaíso. So, many women desire to choose another occupation, rather than be involved in such a difficult political career, which also carries a lot of weight on one’s life decisions: should I get married, or should I remain single? Should I make sure my kids have a good upbringing or not? There are so many options and choices that you have to take everyday that affect your personal life (Muñoz, 2004).

Although such lifestyle changes may seem minor to solving the shortage of women in the decision-making field, every woman I interviewed commented on the challenge of trying to balance her family and home life with the taxing demands, including time constraints, of working in politics. This phenomenon was true despite partisan alliances although different women highlighted certain obstacles of the political career more than others.
Deputy Marcela Cubillos, of the Right-wing UDI party had a more positive outlook on the time constraints of a traditional female politician:

This position has actually been easier for me than other work I have had. I am my own boss; I am responsible if I’m late to congress, etc. I think it is more difficult for other women like secretaries of congress who have to work until 8 at night everyday. I have a lot of freedom. I do believe, though, that politics does have intentions that are not compatible with the reality of life at times. ‘They’ believe that you can be free for all meetings, etc...you also can’t make your own schedule, which is an advantage for women who work outside of politics. I can’t make it to the late-night meetings, but most of those aren’t important anyway (Cubillos, 2004).

The senior secretary of the senate, Sara Orallán echoes Cubillos’s sentiments in discussing the difficulty she faces upholding the demanding time schedule of her political career:

When they (her kids) were younger it was difficult the nights when I was in session until late at night. However, I had to look at it objectively and realize that by making sacrifices and sometimes working late at night, I am contributing to them having more opportunities and a better education. My husband has a more normal schedule and helps me a lot. I also have a nanny that has allowed me to continue my work (Orallán, 2004).

Along with time constraints, some female politicians addressed other resource constraints such as the significant financial cost of electoral campaigns (Franceschet, 2003: 214) and political connections necessary to be successful within the traditional political career pathway. Deputy Maria Antonieta Saa Díaz, of the PPD states, “the campaign finance system, implicit in politics, while less of a challenge now than in years prior, still prevents many women from having the ‘upfront money’ necessary to become a candidate” (Saa, 2004).

Motivational factors such as ambition or drive may also explain whether a woman views the time constraints of a traditional political career in a negative or positive fashion. For example, Deputy Cubillos and Deputy Muñoz, who viewed time constraints very differently, also had very different political career goals.
In answering the question of what her political career goal is, Deputy Cubillos states:

I am a deputy today so that I can help the youth within my party. I have used it [my political career] as a tool to reach out to young people. I haven’t looked at my political life as a ladder; I don’t aspire to have a “higher-up” career within my party or within the country, only a political position that permits me to work for the subjects and interests that I feel passionate about (Cubillos, 2004).

Although Deputy Muñoz did not specifically respond to the political career goal question, her work outside of her political career attending conferences for the international women’s movement and pushing for the feminist agenda in Chile, suggests she has a political career goal that is larger in scope than that of Deputy Cubillos. She is also one of two women who have become appointed as president of their party, no small feat considering the institutional constraints present today in Chile. These varied responses suggest that different motivational goals or personal ambition may change how significant certain supply-side factors are in women’s decision to run for office.

Whether women in legislative careers present the difficulties of working in politics in a positive or negative light, there is no question that the personal life cycles for women create an irregular and inconsistent supply of women, and that her decision to run for office depends on her role as mother and caretaker as well. It is not surprising then, that an alternative political career trajectory has evolved in Chile to break through or at least provide a potential solution to the daunting expectations and grueling lifestyle of a traditional career trajectory.

Breaking in is Hard to Do -- Alternative Paths to Women's Underrepresentation: A Closer Look at Chile's Female Pre-presidential Candidate Phenomenon

While the political institutions in Chile have remained a serious barrier to increasing women’s representation in politics, an alternative presidential career path has proved conducive to promoting women to the highest echelons of decision-making power. By examining the
political career trajectories of the two front-runners in this year’s presidential election, who also happen to be female, I argue that an alternative political career path can be both promising for women, while also emphasizing the severity of institutional barriers in the traditional legislative career path.

**Figure 4: Traditional verses “Alternative” Political Career Trajectories**

The two frontrunner pre-presidential candidates for the *Concertación*, Michelle Bachelet and Soledad Alvear, symbolize different personal value systems and represent different political parties within the coalition, yet both have had surprisingly similar political career trajectories. Why have these women been successful in the presidential career path where women have not been in the legislative arena? I argue that unlike the legislative career path that is heavily dictated by the binominal majoritarian electoral system and the political parties themselves, the presidential career path can be dictated by social base support as well as success in “private” political careers, namely appointments to cabinet ministries, which avoid the daunting candidate selection procedures of publicly elected positions. It is therefore not surprising that both Michelle Bachelet and Soledad Alvear rose to power through demonstrated success as the heads
of state ministries. These ministerial positions are more conducive to women’s lifecycle constraints, providing more flexibility for women to determine their own work schedule and an alternative to the competitive “win-lose” party politicking implicit in the formal arena (Dahlerup, 1998).

In the case of Michelle Bachelet, she once ran for a municipal council seat and got a dismal two percent of the vote. Although unsuccessful in her attempt to become publicly elected, and therefore assume a traditional political career trajectory, her cabinet appointment under Socialist Ricardo Lagos’s presidency allowed her to shine. A medical doctor by trade, Bachelet’s switch to the alternative political career trajectory enabled her to have the mobility and autonomy to be minister of health. In fact, Bachelet was so successful as health minister that she was later promoted to defense minister, which is considered a more politically prestigious position than the usual placement of women in the “softer” sociocultural ministries (Reynolds, 1999).

Research indicates that people who assume ministerial positions of national security, economic planning and foreign affairs often go on to assume national leadership in countries worldwide (Reynolds, 1999).

Bachelet’s avid supporters see her as “a symbol of Chile's transition to democracy,” with a rather unique life story that distinguishes her from the traditional male and female politician prototype. As the daughter of an Air Force general who was tortured and killed for opposing Pinochet’s 1973 coup, and as a victim of torture herself, Bachelet represents a particularly uniting force for building bridges between the civilian government and the post-Pinochet military establishment. In an interview with Reuters, she states: "Since I started my job at the defense ministry, one of the big tasks has been to bring together the civilian world and the military world.
I've always tried my best to push in that direction, and I believe that ... we are now clearly advancing in that direction and I'm satisfied with that” (Aquino, 2005). Her supporters argue that she has a “different way of doing politics,” that is perhaps not due to her gender, but rather her individual style. One supporter exclaims:

She [Michelle Bachelet] has the support that she has from the base, from the social world. This new style of politics focuses on honesty. I know her and I like her because she has a way of thinking that is very distinct [from traditional male/female politicians]. She never says that she is going to do certain projects that she won’t follow through with; she doesn’t make a whole lot of promises that she can’t keep (Ossandón, 2004).

Soledad Alvear, the other frontrunner candidate for the Concertación, represents the centrist Christian Democratic Party (PDC), and although considered a more traditional politician who closely follows her party platform, her career trajectory mirrors that of Bachelet. Recognized as a prominent lawyer, Alvear has held cabinet posts in all three center-left coalition presidential administrations of the Concertación and was the first minister of Chile’s women’s ministry, SERNAM. As the country’s top diplomat, she has distinguished herself in negotiating free trade agreements with several countries including the United States, the European Union and South Korea (Aquino, 2005). In addition, Alvear has held the prestigious cabinet positions of justice minister and foreign minister, and is considered to have more political experience than Michelle Bachelet and the advantage of attracting undecided voters because she represents the political Center. Both women are widely respected within the electorate, and are currently trouncing the Right-wing candidate, Santiago mayor Joaquin Lavín. Recent polls show that Michelle Bachelet is favored to win both the Concertación’s party nomination and the general election (Christian Science Monitor, 2004: 2). However, perhaps not surprisingly, women on the Right, who are in support of the male mayor candidate, Joaquin
Lavin, dismiss the pre-presidential candidate phenomenon as a party strategy rather than a significant stride in women’s empowerment.

Deputy Marcela Cubillos of the UDI states:

I think it’s a mistake of the Concertación to think that by changing the sex of the candidate, they will be able to sell a change of attitude of their coalition within the public. They have wasted many years in power (16 years), and they are saying that now there is a significant change [within the coalition] because of the female candidates. I think today’s Chile does not need a change in sex, but rather a change in ideas (Cubillos, 2004).

Despite the skepticism of their capability from politicians on the Right, the rise of the two female pre-presidential candidates, one of which will receive the Concertación’s nomination for presidency marks a significant break in what scholars consider the “highest glass ceiling,” competing on a gender-neutral playing field for the very top job as president or prime minister (Reynolds, 1999: 18).

The pre-presidential female candidate phenomenon highlights an alternative career trajectory, namely appointment to state ministries rather than enduring traditional candidate selection and public voting procedures, which is successful for women. Such an alternative trajectory provides greater implications for the kind of political style and conditions conducive for women in future political careers. Unlike the highly competitive “win-lose” nature of the traditional legislative path, being appointed as a head of a ministry suggests a greater flexibility for women or an ability to break through the traditional institutional confines of the publicly elected career path while simultaneously creating a personalized and autonomous managerial position.
If institutions have severely disadvantaged women and lifecycle constraints have discouraged them, what explains Bachelet and Alvear’s successful trajectory? Two interviewees suggest it is due to the avid support of the electorate for both candidates:

I think these two [female candidates] have gotten to the position that they have, not because of the men within their parties, but rather in spite of them. I do not think it was a strategy of the Concertación to have this [female] phenomenon occur, rather it is a phenomenon that they [the political parties] have had to accept despite the fact that they have had very little to do with helping these women rise to power. They are accepting these women because of the capability that they have demonstrated (Caro, 2004; De la Maza, 2004).

The personal testimonies imply the following assumption, while party elites would prefer to elect a male pre-presidential candidate, the popularity of these two females in public opinion polls, allowed them to be successful where they have not been in other career trajectories.

Is it possible that the votes of the electorate reflect a change in Chilean culture and preferences? Is the Chilean public more willing to vote for qualified female candidates than the institutions are allowing? Evidence from the surge in female mayors since the 1996 elections suggests this could be a possibility. While national legislative careers are entangled in the binominal system, local elections operate under a proportional representation (PR) electoral system (Siavelis, 1997: 663). The PR system, which is considered the most “women-friendly” electoral system, allows for more flexible selection procedures to reflect the preferences of the electorate rather than the parties. It should therefore come as no surprise that women have had much more success on the local level than on the national level in recent years (Appendix C).19
The regional director of SERNAM in Valparaíso highlights this phenomenon:

There is a wide perception/belief that the government has worked with only part of the population and not with all. The mayors and municipal politics have become the necessary channel for the base population. It is the area where many people express their concerns and needs and it is easier to reach municipal leaders. The local space is much different than that in national politics (Zúñiga, 2004).

The results of the municipal elections indicate that decentralization is occurring in Chile rapidly. While the electorate is more displaced to vote for female candidates, the political institutions, namely party leadership and the binominal system, continue to lag behind (Araujo, 2001: 116).

**Conclusions and Implications**

I argue that the traditional legislative career pathway is marked by both demand-side constraints and supply-side factors that prevent women from entering the decision-making field. Institutional constraints, specifically candidate selection procedures within party leadership, significantly disadvantage women at all candidate selection stages. Further, women’s unique lifecycles contribute to other supply factors such as resource and motivation constraints, which explain why so few women opt to choose the political career path in the first place. Of the women who do decide to enter the political sphere, most only remain for a short, erratic period of time, contributing to the shortage of supply. Such a shortage prevents women from actively being able to change the current political model simply because there are not enough women consistently in the legislature over a substantial period of time. Under these institutional and social challenges, few women ever step forward or become successful at “breaking through.”

One of the greatest limitations of this study is the size of its scope—a further comparison with other Latin American countries will create a larger universe of case studies and strengthen
its validity. In addition, exploring women’s career trajectories in the legislature and executive worldwide to create cross-regional comparisons is imperative to derive a more comprehensive typology for alternative political career trajectories for women. Such expanded analysis would need to be compiled into an edited volume of work. To date, research in this field has largely been confined to statistical analyses of a few established democracies in the West.\textsuperscript{21}

Tracing women’s political career trajectories is perhaps the most direct way scholars can validate the existing personal struggles and needs of women politicians, while simultaneously elucidating and breaking through the barriers to their success in the formal arena. Creating new opportunities for women’s future in political careers depends on raising consciousness of the current limitations to the political pathway, while simultaneously encouraging more women to enter and carve out a new space in the decision-making field. The degree to which a political system increases women’s representation indicates a propensity for the system to include other disfranchised minorities as well (Reynolds, 1998). Deputy Ximena Vidal validates this argument stating that “a woman president in Chile will create a change not only for women, but for other important issues such as the growing inequality that is occurring within society as a whole” (Vidal, 2004). By creating the necessary changes to increase the number of women in formal politics, countries take the first step towards equivalent representation of all minority groups.\textsuperscript{22} Such a change in the descriptive representation in parliament is no small feat; it is perhaps in today’s world the missing “building block” necessary to establishing truly democratic states.\textsuperscript{23}
Appendix (A)

Women Leaders in Chile Questionnaire

1. What is your name?
   Age?
   Political Party Alignment?
   Civil Status?
   Number of Children?
   Place of Residence?

2. How did you get involved in politics?

3. What is your political goal within your particular political career?

Questions 4-9 pertain specifically to the female politician interviewees:

4. How does your party choose its candidates?

5. In your opinion, is it difficult for women to be chosen as candidates within your party? What are certain effective strategies that women use within your party?

6. In your opinion, is it easier, more difficult, or no different for a woman to be chosen as a candidate within your party?

7. If you answered that it is more difficult for a woman to be chosen within your party, in your opinion what is the reason? (For example, machismo, party leaders, and the life of a senator/deputy)

8. Is there a positive discrimination mechanism that helps women, such as a quota within your party for either candidate selection procedures or internal leadership posts?

9. In your opinion, in comparison to the men within your party, do you feel you have the same, more, or less preparation to be politician? (Qualifications could include education, time within your party, contacts/connections to other politicians, connection to political organizations, resources such as money, etc.) Please indicate in your response which qualification measurement you are using.

10. For the elections in the fall of 2005, there are currently two pre-presidential candidates running for office in the Concertación. What do you think are the reasons responsible for this phenomenon?
### Participation of Women in the National Leadership of Political Parties
#### December 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Renovation (RN)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democrats (PDC)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party for Democracy (PPD)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Democratic Union (UDI)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialists of Chile (PS)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communists of Chile (PC)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Social Democrats (PRSD)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanist</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>57</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
<td><strong>70</strong></td>
<td><strong>18.6</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Instituto de la Mujer, Santiago, Chile, 2004.
Appendix (C)

Number of Candidates Elected by Sex and Coalition, Municipalities 1992 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coalition</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Concertación</em> (Center-Left)</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Unión por Chile</em> (Right)</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>La Izquierda</em> (Communist)</td>
<td>91.2</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Otros</em> (Others)</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of Candidates Elected by Sex and Coalition, Municipalities 1996 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coalition</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Concertación</em> (Center-Left)</td>
<td>87.7</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Unión por Chile</em> (Right)</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>La Izquierda</em> (Communist)</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Otros</em> (Others)</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of Candidates Elected by Sex and Coalition, Municipalities 2000 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coalition</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Concertación</em> (Center-Left)</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Unión por Chile</em> (Right)</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>La Izquierda</em> (Communist)</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Otros</em> (Others)</td>
<td>97.87</td>
<td>2.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Caro, Pamela. 2004. Associate Director of CEDEM, interview with the associate director, Santiago, 12 December.


De la Maza, Gonzalo. 2004. Director of the Local Citizen Program, Fundación de la Pobreza, interview with the director, Santiago 15 December.

Díaz Saa, Maria Antonieta. 2004. Deputy of the PPD, interview with the deputy, Valparaíso, Santiago, 9 December.


Garretón, Manuel Antonio. 1987. Las complejidades de la transición invisible, movilizaciones populares y régimen militar en Chile. Santiago: FLACSO.


Jara, Paulina Zúñiga. 2004. Regional Director of SERNAM in Valparaíso, interview with the director, Valparaíso, 12 December.


Orallón, Sara. 2004. Secretary of the Senate, interview with the secretary, Valparaíso, 18 December.


United Nations Development Programme. 2003. “Gender Empowerment Measure and Gender Development Index Worldwide.”
Valenzuela, María Elena. 1987. *La Mujer en el Chile Militar: Todas Iba as a Ser Reinas.* Santiago: Ediciones Chile y América-CESOC-ACHIP.


Villagrán, Paulina. 2004. *Director of Chile Unido,* interview with the director, Santiago, 23 December.


Zúñiga, Paulina. 2004. Director of SERNAM in Valparaíso, interview with the director, Valparaíso, 18 December.

Each country’s GEM rank is calculated on a scale from 1-177, based on the number of countries included in the study. For example, Norway is ranked as number 1 and Sierra Leone is ranked as number 177.

The evolution of the Chilean party system can be understood as part of a legacy of how three basic social cleavages—religious, urban class, and rural class conflicts became politicized and yielded a tripartite party system of the Center, Right, and Left parties respectively (Scully and Mainwaring, 1995: 101). For more detailed information on Chile’s unique electoral system see the following scholars: Guzmán, 1993; Lijphart, 1984, 1990a, 1990b; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1995, Sartori, 1976; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989.

Under the multiparty system, large numbers of representatives were elected from each district, making it possible for small parties to win representation and yield high proportional representation (Carey, 2000). Scholars such as Pippa Norris and Diane Sainsbury suggest that the fragmentation of a multiparty system provides increased access points for women to participate in electoral politics (Norris and Lovenduski, 1993: 320; Sainsbury, 1996), whereas coalition building actually disadvantages incoming democrats and the policy they can pursue. These scholars argue that under Chile’s coalition system, parties on the Left were forced to present similar ideological positions with parties from the Center to create the Center-Left Concertación, even if they veered drastically from the individual ideological positions of the particular party (Carey, 1999: 372). Thus, the prior multiparty system was replaced by a coalition system that diminished the number of parties (Carey, 2000: 137). Andrew Reynolds poses an opposite hypothesis stating that a system where a few strong parties dominate the legislature is more likely to see women elected than a system where many parties win a small number of seats, as established parties have a pool of “safe seats” in which they can place women candidates (Reynolds, 1999: 5).

Peter Siavelis’s analysis of subpact negotiation reveals the logic of how smaller parties use the potential votes that they can add to a subpact to extract as many seats as possible from subpact anchor parties (Siavelis, 2002). Norris and Lovenduski’s study is not specific to lack of women in parliament, but rather lack of all minority groups that are discriminated against on the basis of race, gender, age, occupation, education, etc.

For a detailed analysis of the strategic negotiations that occur between major, or “anchor parties,” and smaller parties, see (Siavelis, 2002).

A point of clarification is necessary to understand Figure 3. The centrist PDC party has traditionally occupied a disproportionately larger percentage of the popular vote for the Concertación than the other two major parties of the PPD and PS. Thus its subpact negotiations are only with minor parties such as the Radical Social Democrats (RSD), rather than between two major parties as in the case of the PPD and the PS.

For a detailed analysis of the interrelation between major and minor parties in coalition alliances, see Siavelis’s seminal work on candidate selection for Chilean Parliamentary elections (Siavelis, 2002).

However, Magda Hinojosa’s analysis of candidate selection procedures of the UDI suggest that they have a highly exclusive candidate selection procedure that is different from most political parties in Chile and thus candidate selection occurs exclusively within party leadership (Hinojosa, 2004).

In the Chilean congress, there are a total of 15 out of 120 deputies that are women and 2 out of 48 publicly elected senators that are women.

Kathya Araujo disproves this argument in her study of Chilean municipal politics arguing that women in parties on the Right are represented in much fewer numbers than parties on the Left in terms of representation in decision-making posts but are represented in greater numbers on the municipal level. Since the traditional trajectory in Chile moves from municipal-national level, an increase in representation of women on the municipal level without an increase in representation on the national level is not significant.

In the legislative elections of 2001, the UDI almost doubled its total vote since the previous legislative election in 1997, becoming the party with the most seats in the Chamber of Deputies (IPU, 2004).

An important point of clarification is the distinction between a party secretary and a state secretary. Implicit in her position as a secretary of the state, Sara Orallán, is non-partisan and states, “since I am a public worker, the only way for them [the state] to fire me is if I do not meet the requirements they have asked of me for 2 years in a row. In
contrast, for secretaries who work for political parties, their job is much less secure because if their deputy or senator doesn’t get re-elected they are no longer employed (Orallán, 2004).

10 Unlike Muñoz, a party outsider who was an important member of the women’s movement, the other female deputy who is president of her party is Isabel Allende, a political insider who is the daughter of the former Socialist president, Salvador Allende.

11 Michelle Bachelet was imprisoned in the infamous Villa Grimaldi, Pinochet-era prison camp.

12 The formation of the Chilean ministerial agency Servicio Nacional de la Mujer [National Women’s Service], or SERNAM, which was created to implement gender-specific public policies (Valenzuela, 1992: 181; Valenzuela, 1998;) was much more controversial within the women’s movement. Despite its appeal to some of the leftist feminists, many women were largely opposed to the formation of SERNAM. Women on the right opposed the agency as a vehicle for radical feminist propaganda and anti-family initiatives (Schild, 1992). Moreover, women organizing in the shantytown communities viewed the creation of SERNAM as an elitist agency, which failed to include the importance of human rights on the agenda. It is important to note that Soledad Alvear never participated in any part of the women’s movement of the 1980’s, and has always followed strict party guidelines. Her appointment to head SERNAM remained controversial among the militant feminists of the 1980’s who viewed her as a barrier to promoting strategic gender issues due to her strong relationship with the Christian Democratic party and the Catholic Church (Personal Interview, De la Maza, 2004).

19 Further research needs to explore the relationship between female municipal and national career paths to create a clearer picture of the political career trajectory of local female politicians and to understand the recent effects of decentralization in Chile.

20 Carolina Tohá, the second youngest female deputy in Chile, stated that because she has two small children, she will be leaving her legislative career this upcoming year. This will mean that the duration of her political career would be only for six years from 2002-2006.

21 One exception is Andrew Reynold’s groundbreaking article: “Women in the Legislatures and Executives of the World: Knocking at the Highest Glass Ceiling” World Politics 51:4: 547-572.

22 Many scholars have looked to the implementation of party-specific and nationally mandated quotas to increase women’s representation world-wide. A quota system is as an institutional mechanism that aims at ensuring women constitute at least a “critical minority” in political life, rather than a token few, and most importantly allows women the possibility to influence the decision-making process as an individual or with specific feminine or feminist view points (Dahlerup, 1998: 92). The implementation of a national quota can have significant effects on the descriptive representation of women in parliament. For example prior to the implementation of a national quota in Argentina, women accounted for an average of 4.2 percent of the Chamber. However with the implementation of a national quota in December of 1995, women accounted for 25.7 percent of the chamber, the highest percentage of female members elected to the national legislature in the Western hemisphere and the sixth highest in the world (Jones, 1996: 82). For further information on the effect of quotas, see (Polanco, 1998; 2002).

23 This definition is derived from Hanna Pitkin who states that descriptive representation is the view that parliament should be a mirror of the nation as a whole (Pitkin, 1978: 10).