The Sum of Ambition?

The Effects of Decentralization on Legislative Careers in Democratic Spain

Alfred P. Montero
Associate Professor
Carleton College
Dept. of Political Science
One North College St.
Northfield MN 55057
amontero@carleton.edu
Abstract

Much recent scholarship on decentralization has postulated the reverse of William Riker’s classic hypothesis that decentralized party systems shape administrative decentralization. These authors posit that the decentralization of the state reshapes intra-party structures by altering patterns of partisan recruitment, agenda-setting, and strategies of representation in policy-making. This study tests the reverse of the Rikerian argument by examining the effects of decentralization on the career trajectories of deputies in the Spanish Chamber (Congreso) during each of the legislatures of the democratic period (1977-2004). Although the proportion of deputies with extensive experience in subnational office has grown in the Congreso, the study shows that these members of the “subnational cohort” do not pursue extended mandates in the chamber and do not tend to hold positions of leadership. These findings belie the notion that administrative decentralization should empower subnational representatives within even highly disciplined parties.
Much of the recent work on decentralization in comparative perspective has focused on the causal links between party system organization and decentralization of the administrative structure of the state (e.g., Willis, Garman, Haggard 1999; Garman, Haggard, Willis 2001). Most of this scholarship has tested variations on William Riker’s (1987) now-classic hypotheses concerning the effects of distinct party system structures on the degree and type of decentralization. A less considered, yet increasingly important area of focus in the research program on decentralization, draws attention to the reverse of the Rikerian causal chain: the implications of decentralization on party system organization. Some scholars see decentralization as the cause and consequence of the crisis of party systems (e.g., Grindle 2000). But in Western Europe, decentralization or “devolution” has produced opportunities for state-wide parties to develop formulas of “compounded representation” capable of representing multiple, territorially-defined constituencies.¹ Ethnonational identities organized in regional parties have appeared as important coalition partners for national parties in Belgium, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Even state-wide parties in countries without many geographically concentrated ethnonational minorities, such as France, Germany, and The Netherlands, have had to confront the need to represent subnational interests (Knapp and Le Gales 1993; Schneider 1999). Decentralization in all of these cases has injected or reinforced a strong territorial dimension in party systems.

For some scholars, the increasing salience of the territorial dimension has the potential to change dramatically the organization of parties. Some predict that decentralization will cause organizational power within parties to shift from national to subnational levels, so that subnational actors (party leaders and activists) will increasingly influence rules and practices as well as positions on policy choice (Panebianco 1988; Maor 1998; Hopkin 2002; Harmel 1983).
In some cases, regionalization causes subnational party branches to gain autonomy from national leaders and activists (Putnam 1993; Geser 1999: 18-19; Downs 1998). Lancaster (1999) argues that federalism (the existence of overlapping yet autonomous jurisdictions) and multiple levels of political self-identification combine to cause party systems to adapt by creating formulas of compounded representation. Greater territorialization of representation should cause parties to reconfigure their internal rules, allowing for greater diversity of subnational interests and experiences within the organization (Tuschhoff 1999).²

In practical terms, these observations mean that decentralization will change intra-party dynamics by altering institutions of political recruitment, agenda-setting, and strategies of representation in policy-making. On all three of these dimensions, decentralization should be expected to enhance the autonomy of the subnational offices of the state-wide parties from their national party brokers. First, as regards political recruitment, subnational party leaders and bureaucrats will develop strong incentives to seize control of nomination procedures. In response, national political leaders and party bureaucrats will attempt to maintain or increase their control over recruitment and candidate selection functions to maximize their own autonomy (Kitschelt 1994: 223; Norris 1997b: 220-22). Decentralization of the administrative structure of the state can favor subnational interests in this tug-of-war by providing them with greater autonomy over policy-making and access to fiscal resources that they use to cultivate constituency support for candidates independent of the preferences of national party leaders.

Subnational party leaders can gain partial control over the agenda-setting function during electoral campaigns if they convince the electorate that the region's interests cannot be represented without promoting the candidacies of “regional representatives.” National party leaders would prefer that candidates stick to the national program, although they may be forced
to give some attention to local concerns. The presence of non-concurrent elections for national and regional office create incentives for national governments to represent regional interests since subnational elections cultivate an important segment of the electorate that is willing to go to the polls on regional issues during national contests (Carey and Shugart 1992; Colomer 1998; Turner 1998). This is especially true in regions with strong ethnonationalist constituencies that may favor the electoral fortunes of regionalist parties versus those of state-wide parties (Heller 2002; Keating 1998, 2001). The importance of addressing subnational interests is also reinforced in advanced industrial democracies by the growing volatility of party electorates and the related tendency to democratize candidate-selection (Pennings and Hazan 2001). Under such conditions, national party leaders have little choice but to listen to as well as advance the careers of their subnational co-partisans lest they lose a significant share of the vote in the next national election (Van Houten 2002: 9; Geser 1999: 19; Hopkin 2002: 8).

For their part, the regional offices of the state-wide parties will develop incentives in a decentralized polity to declare themselves the true defenders of the region's interests, even if this means contradicting the preferences of national party leaders. This dynamic will emerge not only in electoral cycles but in the regular policy-making process as subnational governments and their subnational partisan oppositions lobby the national government for additional resources and authorities on behalf of their region. Therefore, subnational party offices will develop strong incentives to promote the political careers of politicians who share these interests, who have extensive experience in subnational office and are familiar with the problems of the region (Geser 1999: 14-15). Decentralization will have an environmental effect on the internal practices of parties by altering rules of candidate selection to favor the recruitment and career advancement of subnational representatives in the national parliament.
Spain is a key case in the research program on decentralization's effects on party systems. The inauguration of a decentralized state known as the State of the Autonomies coincided with the development of a democratic party system at approximately the same time in the late 1970s. Nationalist claims of autonomy in Catalonia and the Basque Country at the time threatened to upset the delicate balance of ideological interests that shaped the rules of the new democracy in the months and years following the death of longtime dictator Francisco Franco in 1975. Resolving the “regional question” played a crucial role in shaping the institutions of the new democratic regime. The elite consensus that so many observers of the Spanish transition claim was the key to its success threatened to break down most violently on the constitutional issues defining the State of the Autonomies (Linz 1985). The initiation of the State of the Autonomies allowed for the development of a subnational or “peripheral” political elite in addition to a coherent national one (Genieys 1998). Party structures adapted to this increasing “territorialization” of the political elite in Spain by organizing competition among several state-wide parties - the Socialists (PSOE), the centrist Union of the Democratic Center (UCD), the Popular Party (PP; formerly the Alianza Popular), and the former-Communist United Left (IU) - and several regional parties (the Catalan nationalist Convergencia i Unió (CiU), the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), the Galician National Block (BNG), and CC, Canary Island Coalition) among others (Moreno 2002: 405). All of these parties maintained subnational offices and competed for elected office in municipal, regional and national contests. During most of the democratic period, one of the two principal state-wide parties - the PSOE or PP - held an absolute majority in the governing lower house (PSOE during the II-IV terms, 1982-93, and PP during the VII term, 2000-04). But at times they needed to form coalitions with the regional parties to retain a governing majority in the Chamber of Deputies (also known as the Congreso).
Subnational interests therefore exerted unprecedented leverage in the Congreso during the 1990s (PSOE during the 1993-96 period (fifth legislature) and PP during the 1996-00 period (the sixth legislature) with CiU, PNV, and CC). Thus the territorial dimension of representation in democratic Spain involved both a vertical link between national parties and their subnational offices and a horizontal link between state-wide and regionalist/nationalist parties.

The vertical dimension manifested itself within the state-wide parties which often decentralized resources in response to demands by their subnational branches or allied regional parties (Boix 1996). Where they did not do so, as in the case of the UCD which preferred centralization, the organization did not survive (Hopkin 1999: 145-9). These dynamics created particularly robust incentives to transform the Spanish party system into an archetypal case of “compounded representation” (Lancaster 1999). Concurrent elections and periodic intergovernmental distributive conflicts over policy choices highlighted the problems of particular regions for the national electorate and therefore allowed subnational issues to resonate in politically significant ways in Spain (Colomer 1998; Montero 2001). Therefore, the study of this case affords a good opportunity to measure the effects of decentralization on internal party organization dynamics over a long period.

At the same time, the Spanish case is paradoxical for those predicting partisan decentralization in response to administrative decentralization. Among the modern European party systems, national party brokers in Spain have the greatest statutory autonomy and control over their co-partisans’ careers (Kitschelt 1994: 223-24; Field 2003). Deputies’ voting behavior and even the priority they ascribe in opinion surveys to following the dictates of party leaders reflect a tight intra-party discipline across all of the major parties (Martínez and Méndez 2000). Politicians dedicated to interests viewed as marginal by national party brokers will not likely
find a voice inside their parties (Morán 1996). Nevertheless, polls of deputies and analyses of how subnational interests are represented within the parties point to the propensity of an appreciable number of deputies to identify with the interests of their region or the voters from the district in which they were elected (e.g., Delgado 2000; Maurer 2000: 86). There is just enough variation in deputies' responses to raise suspicion about the ability of national party brokers to determine their co-partisans' behavior.

The present study argues that if territorialization of politics will change intra-party dynamics, that change must be reflected in the careers of Spanish politicians. Political career paths highlight where the pyramids of power are in any political order, and they are particularly useful in complex, multi-level polities (Montero and Samuels 2004: 23). Accordingly, López Nieto (2000) argues convincingly that the State of the Autonomies produced ideological, interest, and professional cleavages within the Spanish party system that made the trajectory of political careers more reflective of these complexities than the rules governing the major functions of the parties themselves. Examining the members of the Spanish political class, their motivations, career goals, and behavior, will tell us much about how political institutions work, including those that define the internal dynamics of parties.

The focus on the role of the subnational political class in the Congreso, the governing lower house of the Cortes (the Spanish parliament) is justified by the fact that it is in this setting where the myriad logics shaping the organization of parties - the motives to win elections and control policy decisions - are formed and are played out (Santamaria 1994; Delgado 2000). Internal party organization determines legislative behavior so what happens in the legislature says a great deal about how parties are organized, the extent to which they are centralized, disciplined and institutionalized (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). The study of the Congreso's
membership will also reflect the internal dynamics of the parties given the predominant role
internal party struggles play in determining the placement of candidates on electoral lists and,
therefore, who gets a seat in the Chamber of Deputies (Morán 1996). Studying the career
trajectories of deputies in the Congreso will say much about the relative importance of
experience in subnational offices for determining who composes the leadership of the assembly
and who manages to survive multiple mandates. The longevity and importance of these
“subnational representatives” in the Congreso will tell us much about the relative strength of the
intergovernmental cleavage in the parties.

Political trajectories are long in Spain so they afford much data for comparison. While
all political experience could be expected to be short during the first legislatures, surveys
estimate that almost a quarter of all deputies in the Congreso between 1982 and 1995 had several
years of prior political experience before gaining a seat in parliament and over 80 percent of
those in 1996 identified themselves as professional politicians (Uriarte 2000: 114-16; López
Nieto 2000: 20). As in other established democracies, the ranks of those who live from politics in
Spain have grown over the years.

Politics as a profession does not remove the fact that aspiring deputies bring also their
educational and technical backgrounds to the table. We can expect the members of the Congreso
to have substantial technical knowledge or training given that 82 percent of them hold university
degrees (Baras 2001: 441). The largest professional cohort includes civil servants, academics,
doctors, and engineers who together represent 52 percent of all deputies. Lawyers and
entrepreneurs represent 18 and 17 percent, respectively, of the total, although the former
category is in decline as it is in other European parliaments (Gangas 2000: 277). Spanish
deputies tend to be people with extensive professional experience who view the costs of
circulating into and out of politics as low. As leaders in their respective fields, they can afford to serve in public office while retaining a certain expectation that they will be capable of adapting to the rigors of their profession again if they decide to return. Given low salaries relative to the private sector, ideals and political interests guide them more than the acquisition of personal gain.

The importance of having subnational elected experience is seen by many observers of the Spanish case as the result of the increased professionalization of politics and the result of the growing territorialization of the country's party system. Some scholars have argued that the data on legislative careers illustrate a clear tendency of politicians building their careers by first gaining regional experience and then using that background to secure a position on their party's national list (Morán 1996; Gangas 2000). These partisans with technical and governing experience are increasingly more valuable to modern parties in advanced capitalist countries as they become more concerned with securing and maintaining public office (Katz and Mair 2002).

All of this has implications for the extent to which the party system represents the growing importance of subnational interests. If politicians with subnational experience are more likely to identify with the interests of their region, then we might predict a growing degree of representation of the regions' interests in the Congreso and we might be able to explain which politicians will become most important in the lower chamber by serving the most terms, gaining the advantage of incumbency, and achieving positions of parliamentary leadership on behalf of their parties (López Nieto 2000). The longer these deputies serve, the greater their influence will be. The length of a deputy's incumbency in the Congreso is a determinant of a deputy's informal ties and understanding of the parliamentary process (López Nieto et al. 2003: 19). Deputies who sit for a single mandate have less access to the “kitchen” of the Congreso where the details of
legislation are composed. Also, the greater their positions of importance by becoming party spokespersons for particular pieces of legislation (*ponentes*) or serving on the powerful rules committee, the greater their influence as representatives for their region. Thus, assuming that deputies with the most experience at the subnational level are the most motivated and the best placed to articulate their region's interests, the extent to which this cohort serves long terms and holds leadership positions will confirm that decentralization has reshaped the internal dynamics of the parties. In short, the sum of the subnational cohort's ambitions is the product of increasing subnational political autonomy.

This study analyzes the career trajectories of the subnational cohort in the Congreso for the entire democratic period (1977-2004). The data demonstrate that subnational representation in the Congreso is weak, service to the national party bureaucracy is a more important predictor of parliamentary longevity and leadership, and subnational “representatives” are more likely to stay in the domain of regional and municipal politics. Contrary to the expectations of “compounded representation,” decentralization has not altered party or legislative authority structures in democratic Spain. The main implication of this for intergovernmental relations is that the arena of the national parliament and its party organizations will not be the place where the evolving politics of center-periphery conflicts will be played out.

**The Institutions of Intra-Party Dynamics in Spain**

The relative centralization of parties is a key factor in determining the autonomy of subnational interests in the organization (Maor 1998). The existence of closed-list proportional representation rules in which party leaders determine placement on the electoral list and voters must cast their vote for a list and not for individual candidates, bolsters the discipline of rank-
and-file politicians (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997: 421-29). Internal party rules and the
institutions governing the legislative process also determine to what extent national party brokers
command the behavior of backbenchers. Where the range of action of individual deputies is
constrained by these norms, legislation and electoral strategy are more likely to follow the
preferences of the national partisan leadership.

The Spanish electoral, party, and legislative systems contain all of these characteristics.
National party leaders have final say over the composition of closed electoral lists in multi-
member districts. The rules governing the legislative process leave little room for individual
deputies to articulate views independent from those held by their “parliamentary group” (political
party). All legislation, including amendments and committee work, is shaped by the whips
(portavoces) of the parties. Deputies daring to stray from the party line on electoral or legislative
matters can be routinely punished according to the internal regulations of the parties (Field
2003). Short of losing their seats, they may lose their partisan affiliations and therefore their
capacity to have any effect on the legislative process or keep their seats during the next electoral
cycle.7

Yet the structure of the Spanish party system also has aspects that broaden the range of
views that may be represented within the partisan hierarchy. Decentralized party offices based in
regional capitals and even more locally have an important say in the composition of the lists for
the Congreso. They are also the chief vehicles through which the national parties, and
particularly the state-wide parties (PSOE, PP, and IU), integrate the interests of the regions and
then articulate the organization's position on such questions of local importance.
Decentralization of the party system, then, has increased the autonomy of subnational partisan
offices and in the three key areas in which this autonomy matters most: recruitment, agenda-setting for electoral campaigns, and strategies of representation in policy-making.

Candidate Selection

Some scholars have argued that subnational party leaders exercise the most influence in determining the composition of electoral lists at the regional level in Spain (e.g., Morata 1992). In practice, the electoral committees of the subnational offices select politicians according to a variety of criteria. Not surprisingly, service to the party is the most important factor in getting any single politician on a party's list. A rough indicator of this is that the average period of party affiliation most often exceeds the number of years a deputy has held political posts (Uriarte 2000: 116). This is logical given that in order to receive a viable placement on the electoral list or an *alta* (direct placement in the Congreso to replace a retiring member during a legislative session) aspiring deputies must stand out in their service to the party. It might be argued that doing so is more costly when a politician holds a public office simultaneously, since she must divide her time between her activities on behalf of the party and her responsibilities as an elected or appointed official. Despite this, a large number of deputies have served in subnational appointed or elected office (43.8 percent). Forty-three percent of all deputies have also served in official capacities in their subnational party offices. Holding office in regional and local government and holding a position in the subnational party are positively and significantly correlated at the .01 level for both office-holding and number of years working for the party (.187 and .215, respectively), so there is no prima facie reason to believe that there is a zero-sum relationship.
However, a stronger and more evident tradeoff exists between holding subnational office and working for the national party bureaucracy. This correlation is negative and insignificant regarding holding subnational office and the number of years such office is held. This finding has strong implications for the kind of party service that determines deputies' career possibilities in the Congreso. If subnational service is less valued for promotion within the national party bureaucracy, then the promotion of the careers of politicians with subnational experience must rely primarily on their subnational parties.

**Agenda-Setting**

Do politicians whose political careers in the Congreso are promoted by their subnational party offices articulate the interests of their regions? The few polls of national deputies that have been done in recent years offer a very mixed picture of the salience of regional representation. Using survey data gathered by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), Delgado (2000) and Martínez and Méndez (2000: 235) argue that deputies identify first with the interests of the provincial electorate in which they were elected. National representation and partisan interests are considered secondary. Yet in a poll of 212 deputies done at approximately the same time as the CIS study, Uriarte (2000) reports that only three percent of the respondents thought that representing their region was a major motivation driving their political careers. By far, universalistic ideals such as “serving society” and “generating social change” stand out in deputies’ motivations. Given that the poll data are so inconclusive it is difficult to assess the motivations of deputies. There is sufficient evidence, however, to conclude that at least some deputies identify their representative functions with their region. It is also safe to assume that
those deputies with the most experience in subnational politics are most likely to articulate the
interests of their region.

Internal party rules and those of the Congreso offer individual deputies constrained but
still appreciable opportunities for representing subnational interests, if they are so inclined.
Several regional and national party officials report that individual deputies with the strong
support of their regional party offices can have tremendous say over particular pieces of
legislation or amendments that are of importance to their districts. This influence most often
manifests itself in the form of informal contacts and pressure politics in “the kitchen” of the
Congreso, that is, in an extra-legislative setting. Yet individual deputies may also ask formal
questions during committee sessions that can reflect their region’s interests. More aggressive and
rarer forms of subnational interest aggregation in the Congreso might also occur. As a last
recourse, individual deputies may threaten to leave their parties or actually do so without losing
their seats. Under Spanish constitutional law, seats in all legislatures belong to individual
deputies and not their parties (Esteban 1990). Yet how often or how effective these threats have
been in representing some crucial interest of a subnational government is difficult to assess. In
any case, acting on the threat removes the deputy's influence on his/her former party, and
threatening will probably remove the deputy from the party's electoral list in the next cycle.

Time and position are the two proximate factors that explain the extent to which any
deputy with extensive subnational experience and close ties to their subnational party office will
influence the content of the legislative or electoral agenda. Members of the subnational cohort
that hold multiple terms and leadership positions are more likely to be heard on matters of
particular importance to them and their local bailiwicks.
Partisan Center-Periphery Relations

The promotion of the careers of deputies with extensive subnational experience may also be a priority of national party brokers, if these legislators offer the party a particular advantage in an electorally important region. Decentralization creates incentives not only for subnational party offices to articulate themselves as the defenders of their region's primary interests, it gives national party strategists incentives to listen to those located in regions and electoral districts where the seats of rival parties are vulnerable.

To be sure, such electoral considerations are intertwined with policy choices. Gibson (1997) underscores the necessity for reformist governing parties to maintain a strong link between an electoral coalition and a policy coalition, to balance one against the other and maintain a party in power during a difficult period of reform. Geographic constituencies form important segments of each of these coalitions. For example, key aspects of Spain's neoliberal shift during the 1980s and early 1990s took on geographic dimensions that were important to the Socialists' abilities to balance the interests of its electoral and policy coalitions (Smith 1998).

The available empirical analysis of spending trends in the 1987-92 period of Socialist rule underscores a redistributive logic. That is, regions that had strong Socialist memberships and were lesser developed, received more than the average share of non-military spending (Boix 1998: 141-45). Yet one might also imagine that Socialist spending could tend to concentrate in regions that were electorally socialist but were hurt by the PSOE's economic reforms. For example, industrial down-sizing in old industrial regions that either were solidly Socialist such as Asturias or contested by nationalist parties such as the Basque Country and Catalonia created tensions between the PSOE's electoral and policy strategies.
Putting aside the logic governing redistribution, it may simply be that the electoralist and policy-coalition logics come together in the selection of particular electoral districts in which the promotion of partisans with extensive “local experience” would bring rewards to the national party. Some scholars suggest that the state-wide parties have increasingly developed strong incentives to concentrate their attention on regions in which their rivals could slip electorally. Capo Giol (2000: 72-73) shows that certain electoral districts are more important to the two centrist parties (PSOE and PP) than others in gaining seats to form an absolute majority in the Congreso. Therefore, the hierarchy of important regions for each party will not only be different but will be based on a mixed criteria. Generally, parties will be motivated to reinforce the support of co-partisan regions but they will also wish to expand their parliamentary positions by undercutting the electoral support of regions currently supporting their rivals. The appendix outlines a hierarchy of electoral districts for the two main parties based on the 1996 general elections.

Does recruiting and elevating politicians with subnational experience an important part of the strategy of gaining the support of these high-priority districts? Once again, time and position are important. If the longevity and leadership position of deputies is a proximate factor in their influence, are members of the subnational cohort from priority districts more likely to have successful careers in the Congreso?

The Effects of Subnational Experience on Legislative Longevity and Leadership

The growing availability of congressional archives and biographical data on Spanish deputies’ careers makes possible a systematic analysis of the professional political trajectories of all 1,597 members of the eight legislative sessions beginning with the Constituent Assembly
(1977-79) and continuing through the seven subsequent legislatures until the 2000-04 congress. Furthermore, experience as a representative at either the national or subnational levels of government occurs in discrete periods of time, making sequencing easier to map out. Since January 1985, the Law of Incompatibility prohibited parliamentarians from holding elected office at the subnational or national level concurrently with their positions in the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate. Additionally, the major parties instituted their own incompatibility norms. Practical impediments too, such as the growing complexity of political office on the national and subnational levels, make combining responsibilities prohibitive (Delgado 2000).

While there are few studies on the sequencing of political careers in Spain, studies based primarily on surveys of politicians consistently indicate that most respondents begin their political lives in local government (e.g., López Nieto 2000: 14; Delgado 2000; Uriarte 2000). The current study demonstrates that the actual number is below fifty percent (43) for all deputies (although it is above 50 percent for the latter three legislatures), but this is still an appreciable cohort. The data, summarized on Table 1, also confirm that prior experience with legislative positions is clearly more important for recommending a member of the subnational cohort to the Congreso. Municipal councilors (45 percent) and regional deputies (39 percent) compose a larger share of the subnational cohort than regional chancellors (18 percent) or mayors (17 percent). This finding comports with López Nieto (2000) who found in her surveys of mayors a general reluctance to move onto a national legislative career.

This last finding may be indicative of a general inhibition on the part of former executives in subnational politics to move to the Congreso. The tendency is most apparent for former presidents of the regions. López Nieto (2002: 72) notes in her study of the first four
legislative periods that 18 of the 42 regional presidents served in the Congreso prior to becoming subnational executives (43 percent). However, only 5 (or 12 percent) went to the Congreso after serving as regional presidents. This is the same number that went to the much less powerful upper house, the Senate, after serving as regional executives. It is reasonable to assume that having congressional experience helps regional presidents lobby for their region's concerns. Yet parliamentary parties do not gain the benefit of the experience of these regional presidents when they leave office.

Some scholars have argued that the circulation of elites in subnational office prior to going to the Congreso can be thought to reinforce subnational experience in this cohort (e.g., López Nieto 2000: 22). While this is logical, the current study finds that there is not much circulation of subnational elites. Most of the 699 cases of deputies with subnational experience held one kind of office (mayors, town councilors, regional legislators, regional chancellors (subnational ministries), or other appointed/elected office). Not surprisingly, seventy-nine percent held elected office while thirty-one percent held appointed office. The depth of subnational experience, measured by the number of years in appointed and/or elected office at the regional/local level is also substantial. Fifty percent were in office 1-4 years, 26 percent 5-8 years, and 24 percent nine or more years. Table 1 indicates that subnational experience increased with each legislature. Perhaps most striking is the role of particular forms of subnational experience at the municipal level and not just in regional parliaments. Decentralization produced career avenues for municipal as well as regional politicians to make their way to the Congreso. Decentralization also produced a variety of career pathways to the Congreso, allowing diverse appointed and other kinds of elected and selected officials to acquire seats in the lower house.
Some scholars have argued that analysis of career trajectories in the upper house, the Senate, is more indicative of subnational representation given that this is constitutionally the “chamber of territorial representation.” Yet the Senate's relative weakness in composing legislation makes it an unlikely focus for subnational party offices interested in promoting “their" politicians. The Senate functions as a second reader of legislation, making technical changes in laws but it does not have any power to initiate or radically change legislation without the consent of the Congreso. Furthermore, its members are elected through a plurality system, that in comparison to the closed-list PR system that governs the rest of the legislative system in Spain, favors the promotion of candidates that are easily recognizable to their constituents (Morán 1989: 79). This may favor individual politicians who take on the mantle of “regional representatives" but partisan discipline helps to keep senators in line with the wishes of governing parties and coalitions in the Congreso. While forty-four of the 252 senators are elected by the unicameral regional parliaments, partisan discipline controls their behavior. Finally, analysis of senatorial careers shows that these politicians tend to be inexperienced in parliamentary offices (Morán 1989: 78). The present study finds that only 154 deputies (9.6 percent) served in the Senate prior to serving in the Congreso.15 Even if the Senate were the chamber of territorial representation, the average senator with legislative experience does not spend much time there. Over 97 percent spent two terms or less there as compared to 76 percent for the same number of terms in the Congreso.

Given that there is a substantial and growing cohort of deputies in the Congreso with significant experience in subnational elected office, one might expect this group to exert a noticeable influence on legislation and the workings of their parties. That influence depends upon the length of incumbency and the leadership position of deputies in the subnational cohort.
If decentralization has fundamentally altered the structures of partisan careers and subnational party offices have gained autonomy in promoting “their” politicians, then members of the subnational cohort should hold positions of leadership and retain the advantages of incumbency to a degree above what would be expected of politicians without experience in subnational office.

*Longevity*

All studies of the Congreso have demonstrated that legislative careers are short-lived (e.g., Moran 1989, 1996; Gangas 2000; López Nieto 2001). This study confirms that 52.5 percent of all deputies served only one term in the Congreso; only about 13 percent served four terms or more. Given that 17.5 percent of all deputies also failed to complete their terms, we can conclude that the extent of turnover in the Congreso is high. In the seventh legislature, for example, 41 percent of deputies were new to the lower house.

While their stay in the Congreso is on average short, political careers in Spain are long. The long-standing culturalist view in Spain that adopting “politics as a profession” is frowned upon is not verified by what people who go into politics actually do. How then can we account for the generally short careers of deputies in the single most powerful political forum in Spain?

The two most prominent, mutually-supporting reasons given by scholars of the Congreso are that parliamentary life is unrewarding (i.e., low salaries compared to the private sector, little office space, the overpowering nature of party leadership) for ambitious politicians and the Law of Incompatibility reduces career politicians' access to patronage (e.g., López Nieto 2001: 225; Morán 1989: 79-80). If true, we should see much circulation of career politicians through the Congreso onto more promising political positions, and particularly executive ones given the high
job approval ratings reported by mayors and regional presidents. The present study found that few deputies take executive positions in the national public bureaucracy (5.9 percent) or in subnational appointed or elected office (11.6 percent) once they leave the Congreso. We might also see a reluctance on the part of subnational politicians to go to Madrid, but the large number that have belies this expectation.

If political careers are long in Spain, and the extensive years of experience in subnational elected and appointed office for a large cohort suggests that they are, then two salient trajectories involving parliamentary mandates should be evident: (1) politicians with extensive subnational experience top-off their careers with a stint in the Congreso or (2) politicians pursuing careers pass-through the Congreso and then return to subnational office. Table 2 demonstrates that the second tendency is particularly weak. The trend shows a decline in the percentage of deputies for each legislative session that continue their political careers at the subnational level. This is striking for terms III-VI as this was precisely the most active period for the development of the State of the Autonomies. Decentralization, then, promoted a movement of politicians from the subnational level to the national level but not in reverse. The evidence suggests a predominant topping-off tendency. This has implications for how decentralization affects legislative careers. Observers of the State of the Autonomies have speculated that the emergence of regional governments would cause an increasing number of deputies to extend their political careers by seeking office at the subnational level (e.g., Morán 1989: 78). Since topping-off is a greater tendency than passing-through, and Senate experience is negligible, the most experienced politicians in the Congreso are members of the subnational cohort and these politicians, like those without subnational experience tend to end their political careers in Madrid.

[Table 2: Percent of Deputies Continuing Careers in Subnational Office, LC-VII here]
The topping-off tendency puts even greater weight on the relative longevity of deputies in the Congreso. Since these politicians are unlikely to extend their experience and influence beyond this body, if they represent subnational interests, the regions, cities, and subnational party offices must get the most out of these politicians while they serve in the Congreso. The preference of subnational interests would be to extend the number of legislative terms these politicians serve to maximize their own influence.

Leadership

Placing “their” deputies in leadership positions in the parties and the Congreso is central to any attempt by subnational interests to project their preferences into the legislative process. Longevity and leadership are intertwined as those politicians who have the longest runs in the Congreso also assume positions of leadership. They become the spokespersons or whips for their parliamentary groups, they assume the job of ponente or the spokesperson on legislative committees, and they serve as representatives for their parties on the important rules committee of the chamber.

Previous analyses have conjectured a strong relationship between party leadership, parliamentary leadership, and longevity (e.g., Morán 1989: 83) and the present study confirms this strong correlation. Of the total number of deputies, this study found 18.2 percent who held positions as ponente on committees, served on the rules committee of the chamber, or held the responsibility of party whip. Veterans of leadership positions tend to have longer stints in the Congreso compared to those who do not have this experience (.364, p<.01). In this study committee membership (e.g., the position of vocal) in itself was not counted as leadership, nor was any leadership role in the party bureaucracy outside of parliament considered a position of
legislative leadership. Only deputies serving in parliamentary offices with responsibility over the legislative process were considered leaders.

*The Statistical Analysis*

First we estimated the effects on longevity for all deputies (N=1597) based on key explanatory variables representing regional experience, local and national party activity, and experience in the national bureaucracy of the Spanish state. Using an ordinary least squares regression analysis we constructed a model including two regional experience variables, a dummy for subnational experience (REGBEF) and an interval variable for years of experience (REGYRS), plus three variables for party activity (PARLOCE is a dummy for holding an executive position in the subnational party office, PARLOC# is the number of years working for the subnational party, and NATPARB is a dummy for holding an executive position in the national party). We also included dummy variables for holding a position in the national bureaucracy (STOFBEF) and being a parliamentary leader (PORTA).

[Table 3: Estimate of Longevity in the Congreso, LC-VII here]

The results reported in Table 3 demonstrate that regional experience is not a predictor of longevity. This was the case even when we estimated using variables for elected versus appointed office and particular kinds of office (e.g., mayors, regional deputies, chancellors, town councilors, etc.). The years of subnational experience variable is significant but the sign runs in the wrong direction. This might be related to incompatibility norms and the inclusion of the first legislatures in which subnational experience was limited. We tested the model for the final three legislatures, which had the highest levels of subnational experience, yet we found the same negative and statistically significant relation. This was true for deputies who served for the first
time in the fifth and seventh legislatures and for those serving in each of the final three legislatures. The correlation was insignificant for deputies who served for the first time in the sixth legislature only and the fifth and sixth and the sixth and seventh consecutively. This suggests that temporal tradeoffs may explain some of the inverse relationship between subnational experience and longevity in the Congreso but some of the results suggest that other factors are relevant.

The consistent significance of the leadership and partisan variables underscore the role of service to the party apparatus at both the national and subnational levels as a reasonably strong predictor of longevity. Previous experience in the national bureaucracy is also significant. This latter factor is linked to national party service as appointments to ministries and subministerial offices go to partisan leaders at the national level. As suggested above, experience in holding an executive position in the national party is more important than holding such a position at the regional level. Yet years of experience working for the subnational party is significant. This suggests that sustained party activism is a more important credential than titles or experience in elected or appointed office prior to taking a seat in the Congreso.

We estimated a second model to isolate the role of partisan factors independent of the leadership variable, which the first model confirmed is strongly correlated with longevity. Its removal underscores the importance of activism at the subnational level and proven leadership in the party in determining longevity. This factor remained a robust predictor even when we ran models controlling for kind of affiliation, namely to the state-wide (PP and PSOE) and nationalist parties (e.g., CiU, PNV, PA, BNG, etc.). In short, career success in parliament is a function of service to the party rather than service to the region, even in the case of nationalist/regionalist parties.
One possible explanation for the shorter-lived parliamentary experience of the subnational cohort is that this group associates its public life more closely with directly serving constituents. The decisions of these politicians at the local and regional levels are more easily linked to specific social demands and communities. Mayors, regional deputies, and town councilors are also more accustomed to having greater influence over the legislative process, which helps to account for the relatively higher job-satisfaction ratings these respondents provide in surveys (e.g., López Nieto 2000: 14-18). This logic is consistent with the data that highlight two types of career trajectories: public servants versus political servants. The subnational cohort is more likely to be disproportionately composed by public servants, given that service to the party is more important than service to the public in elected and appointed office in determining longevity in the Congreso. This point also provides a partial explanation for the topping-off tendency, at least for the subnational cohort. Politicians dedicated to public service rather than party service are the least likely to be satisfied with their experiences in the party-dominated legislative process. This point, however, requires further confirmation through data on subnational politicians in general, their links to subnational party offices, and their profile as public versus political servants.

The results regarding longevity parallel the results for parliamentary leadership as shown in Table 4. We estimated the leadership of deputies using a binomial logistic regression analysis including the same independent variables. Service to the party and legislative terms served appear as the most robust predictors of parliamentary leadership. In this and multiple models, previous subnational experience measured dichotomously or by number of years served was insignificant. Local party affiliation and the holding of partisan office were also unimportant.
factors in determining leadership. The model predicted correctly at an 81.8 percent level. The results underscore the role of service to the national party.

[Table 4: Estimate of Parliamentary Leadership in the Congreso, LC-VII]

Since one or the other state-wide parties controlled the Congreso, party affiliation may have an independent effect on leadership selection. Model two utilizes dummies for each of the state-wide parties and a dummy for affiliation to a nationalist party. The only noteworthy result is that the Socialists would be less likely to become leaders. This finding may reflect the tendency of the PSOE, more than the PP or the nationalist parties, to concentrate leadership posts in a small group at the national level during their thirteen years in power. Nevertheless, particular affiliations and the holding of national appointments are not strong predictors of parliamentary leadership. Parliamentary leaders are those most likely to serve the offices of the national party and have the benefit of experience in more than the average number of terms served in the legislature. Given that national party position was a strong predictor of longevity in the linear models, it is service to the national party that matters most in determining the success of deputies. Regional experience may even be a hindrance to ambitious deputies as the linear models suggested.

The findings show that decentralization did not produce systemic influence in parliament for politicians with subnational experience, but it does not exclude the existence of individuals from particular subnational regions and electoral districts that may exercise extraordinary influence on behalf of their regions. Above I argued that the state-wide parties have a sense for which seats are most vulnerable to being lost to the rival party. It could be argued that the incumbent's party would prefer to place politicians on these lists that are familiar with these particular districts. To allow these politicians to serve as long as possible they should receive
leadership spots and guaranteed upper-level placement on electoral lists over time. Using the list of preferred districts from the appendix we created an even four-fold hierarchy of thirteen districts per each tier. We focused our analysis on the final three legislatures to maximize the population of deputies with subnational experience. Table 5 reports the results. The figures indicate that incumbent parties in high priority districts place their most experienced deputies in these seats and these deputies also tend to be in leadership positions. However, subnational experience does not appear to be valued as much by incumbent parties. The lowest percentage for the indexed tiers of deputies with subnational experience is the highest priority category. While more than half of the entire cohort from the three latter legislatures tended to have subnational experience, these deputies did not tend to cluster in the high priority districts any more than those deputies without subnational experience. The same is true of the cohort of legislative leaders. The data do not indicate any advantage to subnational experience in the placement of leaders with such backgrounds in high priority districts.

\[\text{Table 5: Electoral District Priorities for PP and PSOE and Deputy Longevity and Leadership, Sessions V-VII here}\]

Conclusions

This study found little evidence in support of the Rikerian argument reversed in democratic Spain. The sum of the subnational cohort's ambitions is not a more decentralized party system. Administrative decentralization does not guarantee that subnational interests will find the space to represent their particular interests within party or parliament. This is true despite the concurrent timing of elections, the growing cohort of deputies with subnational
experience in the Congreso, the ability of subnational party offices to recruit and place candidates on party lists, and the increasing importance of regional issues in national elections.

The data are also helpful for understanding the general trends in career trajectories in Spain. Legislative careers in the Congreso are short overall with few notable differences among parties. Why this is the case has much to do with the vacuousness of parliamentary life for non-leaders. Yet this study also suggests that while parliamentary careers tend to be short, political careers are not. Two salient trajectories involving parliamentary mandates are evident in the results: (1) politicians with extensive subnational experience top-off their careers with a stint in the Congreso and (2) politicians pursuing careers pass-through the Congreso and then return to subnational office. The prevalence of topping-off limits the benefits accrued from the circulation of elites from the Congreso to other institutions, including those at the subnational level. When this is considered alongside our finding that subnational experience is a poor predictor of legislative leadership and longevity, it becomes clear that regional representation is weak in the Congreso and whatever exists is of little consequence for the development of the subnational political class.

Despite recent efforts to make the Senate a chamber of “territorial representation,” experience in this body appears to have little bearing on career success in the Congreso. Elite analysis done by Baena de Alcázar (1999: 294-95) suggests that senators are less likely than deputies to come from the most influential ranks of politics, business, or society. So they are unlikely to hold leadership positions in the Congreso. Their circulation is another matter. Morán (1996) speculates that the professional careers of these politicians should flow from Congreso to Senate and then (back) to the regions, but the present study does not support this conclusion. Given the low number of deputies that go to the Senate, one may surmise that members of the
upper house have generally limited experience with the parliamentary process at the national level, thus weakening the ability of the Senate to hold its own against the Congreso in matters of import to the regions.

Another outcome of the study that has implications for understanding intergovernmental relations in multi-tiered states with disciplined parties and closed parliamentary processes is that subnational “representatives” are more likely to stay in the domain of regional and municipal politics. Comparisons of the findings of this study with others on the career trajectories of regional politicians suggest that the national and subnational political classes in Spain may be very different. Where this study shows only a weak cohort of subnational representation in the Congreso, studies of the regional parliaments demonstrate that two-thirds of their composition is made up of politicians with experience and actual responsibilities in local and other regional positions (Morata 1992). The other third may be composed of individuals who try a period of public service at relatively low cost and then return to private life (Geser 1999: 6-7). Representation of place thus appears as a more important aspect of the regional parliaments than it does of the national one.

A related finding in this study is that the kind of party service is a strong determiner of career success in the Congreso. The link between party service and public service is stronger in the regional parliaments. For example, Morata's (1992) study of political careers in the regional parliaments of Andalusia, Catalonia, Galicia, and Valencia showed that over 62 percent of deputies held administrative positions in their parties. It appears that service to the local party and service to the national party produce different implications for deputies' careers. Panebianco (1988: Ch. 12) and more recent studies of decentralized polities (Willis et al. 1999) have argued that national party bureaucrats tend to favor centralization as it enhances their own control over
their partisan rank-and-file. Politicians with this background are not likely to value subnational public service as a primary means for building a political career that will maximize their influence in the Congreso. Since this study showed that service to the national party is more important for explaining not only survivability but leadership, this cohort's perceptions are reinforced by the facts of deputy career advancement. By contrast, at the regional level, deputies may be servants of both the party and the public. So, “subnational representation” in the legislative system in Spain is likely to rest in subnational politics alone. This has implications for coordinating intergovernmental relations. Since center-periphery cooperation and conflict cannot be played out in the parliament or within the legislative parties, it must move to other intergovernmental arenas, perhaps the larger party structures, intergovernmental policy forums, and uninstitutionalized lobbying and distributional conflict. Yet one must recognize that more longitudinal studies of subnational parliaments will be necessary to verify the underlying contrast between national and subnational career trajectories.

Another matter for further research is the issue of the subnational cohort's motivations and actions while in the Congreso. This is a notoriously understudied question in Spain and in comparative perspective (Delgado 2000; Putnam 1973). López Nieto (2000: 21) detected a bifurcation of her respondents into individualistic deputies and party-oriented ones. This is similar to the present finding that there may be a political servant/public servant distinction. Yet she attempts to go further than the present study by asking “supply side” questions concerning what motivates public servants (Norris 1997b: 224-29). Most relevant to our interests on the effects of decentralization, one might ask whether members of the subnational cohort behave in the Congreso in ways that identify them with the functions of “subnational representatives,”
despite their limited influence. As scholars learn more about political careers in the Congreso, motivations will become a more salient focus of study.
References


Table 1: Regional Experience, LC-VII

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>% Regional Experience</th>
<th>Appointed Office *</th>
<th>Elected Office *</th>
<th>Regional Deputies</th>
<th>Municipal Council</th>
<th>Mayors</th>
<th>Regional Chancellors</th>
<th>Other *</th>
<th>Average Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LC</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>1.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>2.18</td>
</tr>
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<td>49.2</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>2.91</td>
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<td>V</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>3.49</td>
</tr>
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<td>VI</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>3.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>4.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=1597

All figures are percentages except the final column.

* The sum of the second and third columns does not equal the first because some deputies were counted twice for having both kinds of experience.

* Includes regional presidents and positions in subnational bureaucracy below chancellor level, provincial and municipal appointments and elected office.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subnational Office, LC-VII</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LC</td>
<td>17.5</td>
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<td>13.8</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Only includes deputies that left during their terms.*
Table 3: Estimate of Longevity in the Congreso, LC-VII

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variable</th>
<th>Model I</th>
<th>Model II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td><strong>1.370</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.481</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.049)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REOGREF</td>
<td>8.608E-02</td>
<td>7.726E-02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGYRS</td>
<td><strong>-3.808E-02</strong></td>
<td><strong>-4.121E-02</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.010)</td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARLOCE</td>
<td>-7.751E-02</td>
<td>-1.104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.075)</td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARLOC#</td>
<td><strong>7.086E-02</strong></td>
<td><strong>7.612E-02</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATFARB</td>
<td><strong>.599</strong></td>
<td><strong>.766</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STOBFBEF</td>
<td><strong>.277</strong></td>
<td><strong>.329</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.083)</td>
<td>(0.087)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PORTA</td>
<td><strong>.947</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td></td>
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R squared: .307, .239
N: 1397, 1397

All coefficients in bold are significant: **p<.001, *p<.01 (two-tailed).

Table 4: Estimate of Parliamentary Leadership in the Congreso, LC-VII

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Explanatory Variable</th>
<th>Model I</th>
<th>Model II</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td><strong>-2.708</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(1.359)</td>
<td>(1.180)</td>
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<tr>
<td>REGBREF</td>
<td>-.132</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.209)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REOGYRS</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARLOCE</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.193)</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATFARB</td>
<td><strong>.718</strong></td>
<td><strong>.643</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.149)</td>
<td>(1.151)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STOBFBEF</td>
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<td>(0.190)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEGIS#</td>
<td><strong>.526</strong></td>
<td><strong>.551</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PP</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.200)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSOE</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>NATION</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.266)</td>
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Log likelihood: 1307.8, 1300.4
% Predicted: 81.8, 81.5
Nage/Genbe R sq. 197, 204
N: 1397, 1397

All coefficients in bold are significant: **p<.001, *p<.01 (two-tailed).
### Table 5: Electoral District Priorities for PP and PSOE and Deputy Longevity and Leadership, Sessions V-VII

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District Index</th>
<th>No. of Deputies</th>
<th>Legislative Terms</th>
<th>No. of Leaders</th>
<th>Subnational Cohort</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tier 1</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>120 50 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier 2</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>94   62 62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier 3</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>102 61 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tier 4</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>56   62 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>649</td>
<td>1579</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix: Hierarchy of Electoral Districts, PSOE and PP (1996 General Elections)\textsuperscript{a}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PP</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>PSOE</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>PP</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>PSOE</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ciu. Real</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>Cádiz</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>Cádiz</td>
<td>8.67</td>
<td>Valladolid</td>
<td>6.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Córdoba</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>Jaén</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>Murcia</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>Palencia</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>Salamanca</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>León</td>
<td>9.01</td>
<td>Alicante</td>
<td>6.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenerife</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>Huelva</td>
<td>9.13</td>
<td>Pontevedra</td>
<td>7.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alicante</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>Lérida</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>Granada</td>
<td>10.12</td>
<td>Cantabria</td>
<td>7.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Málaga</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>Álava</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>Segovía</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>Zaragoza</td>
<td>8.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaragoza</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>Murcia</td>
<td>1.07</td>
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\textsuperscript{a} Necessary transfer of percentage of votes in each district so that the non-incumbent rival can acquire a deputy.

1. For a useful review of these trends, see Brzinski, Lancaster and Tuschhoff (1999), Keating (1998), Downs 1998 and Van Houten (2003).

2. This assumption is consistent with how parliaments in established democracies have become more diverse due to the growing diversity of the class, gender, and education backgrounds of their parliamentarians (Norris 1997a: 6-7).

3. Following the 1982 general elections, this party eroded and its deputies mostly went to the Alianza Popular, the predecessor to the center-right PP.

4. The first two legislatures, the Constituent Assembly and the first congress, were also minorititarian. UCD relied on alliances with nationalists and centrists.

5. Despite this, the parties and the Cortes itself do not release standardized information on the deputies beyond the basic demographic and professional biographies. Information on practices, informal and formal, as well as professional backgrounds must be gleaned from multiple sources, including interviews. For more on the problems of data gathering on legislative careers in Spain, see Morán (1996).

6. A significant percentage of deputies identified with more than one career category. Over twelve percent of the total were classified has having two or more professional areas.

7. Independent deputies are particularly weak since all unaffiliated representatives are lumped into the Grupo Mixto (Mixed Group - GM), a heterogenous group that finds it difficult to act as a single entity, as legislative institutions require for any parliamentary group to have influence over the Congreso.

8. One obvious explanation for this is that working for the national party requires physical
displacement to Madrid, making subnational public service less viable. This correlation may be
weaker for the nationalist parties whose base is in the regional capitals, but it may exist
nonetheless for nationalist municipal politicians whose service places them outside the regional
capitals.

9. This observation is based on a series of interviews of organizational and general secretaries of
the major parties and the nationalist parties, conducted by the author in seven Spanish regions
during 2002-03. The regions covered by this study were Andalusia, Asturias, the Basque
Country, Catalonia, Galicia, Madrid, and Valencia.

10. The formula and logic for Capo Giol’s listing cannot be explained fully here. Its structure is
based on the percentage of the vote swing in a given electoral district for the election of a single
deputy by the non-incumbent rival. The author uses data from the general elections of 1993 and
1996 to compose two lists.

11. The author gathered this biographical data from the archives of the Congreso and a recent
comprehensive who's who-type study of all deputies in the Spanish democratic period
(Menéndez Gijón and Fontes 2002). Data for each legislature includes all deputies who served,
regardless of whether they served complete terms or not. The years of the legislatures are:
LC=1977-79; I=1979-82; II=1982-86; III=1986-89; IV=1989-93; V=1993-96; VI=1996-00;
VII=2000-04.

12. Scholars of political careers most often argue that support for the incompatibility law is
based on a pervasive cultural aversion to "accumulating political offices" (acumulación de
cargos). See Baena de Alcázar (1999), López Nieto (2000: 15), and Martínez and Méndez
13. I use the term “chancellor” to refer to the appointed heads of subnational policy secretariats or chancelleries.

14. The ten point overlap in the numbers is for deputies who held both appointed and elected office.

15. The average is higher for the last four legislatures (13.3) but notably inconsistent across these sessions (IV=11.9; V=14.5; VI=13.2; VII=13.7).

16. Concerning the survey data in support of the greater attractiveness of mayoralties and the low turnover in municipal politics in comparison to the national congress, see López Nieto (2000: 14-15).

17. These individuals are designated by their parties, usually those in the majority, to shape legislation in committee before taking draft laws to plenary sessions. The *ponente* is the single most important figure on a committee.

18. Pearson tests confirmed that there was little possibility of multicollinearity among the partisan variables and the legislative longevity and leadership dependent variables. All independent variables in the model had acceptable tolerance values.

19. This is particularly true of mayors, most of whom enjoy absolute majorities on their respective municipal councils.

20. In order to test the strength of the national party service variable, we ran a model that excluded legislative experience. National party service predicted parliamentary leadership even more robustly (1.166, p<.001) and state office remained insignificant. The goodness of fit, however, was inferior to model 2.